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BERGSON AND PERSONALISM

BY THE EDITOR

Personalia

My first acquaintance with Henri Bergson was on the occasion of a lecture at Harvard given on his visit to America in 1913. No one who heard that lecture but will vividly recall the beautiful diction and poetic enthusiasm of the lecturer. My second was at Paris in 1919, when, soon after the signing of the Armistice, he agreed to act as chairman of my committee of study at the Sorbonne. I was impressed with the extreme simplicity and good taste of the Bergson home as well as with the unfailing courtesy and kindness of those who dwelt there. At that time I was engaged in writing a criticism of Bergson's work under the title, *Bergson and Personal Realism*. Although under Professor Bergson's guidance and read by him, it was in the main exceedingly critical of his standpoints. There is little doubt in my mind now that there were about it some evidences of embryonic thinking, but to these Bergson did not call my attention. I do not recall any other time in life ever having raised a philosophic issue with all the belligerence at my command, to be met with no challenge at all. There could have been no more telling argument against me than this argument of silent good will. At the time Professor Bergson spoke of one interpreter who knew his system better than any other man, a certain Herbert Wildon Carr, an Englishman, whose work on the Philosophy of Change had already been a part of my reading. It was Bergson's enthusi-

asm, however, that attracted my particular attention to the man who was later to become my greatly loved colleague and inspirer.

Indeed, it was Carr himself who provided me with the most illuminating insight into Bergson and enabled me to discover the fundamental friendliness of appreciation which should characterize our systems of thought. Hence, after fourteen years I come to write not so much a criticism as a revaluation of the work and philosophy of Henri Bergson. I have reread the chapters of my book, *Bergson and Personal Realism*, in preparing this paper and still feel, though quite willing to yield everything, the cogency of many of its arguments. Yet I feel that I am prepared for a new appreciation of Bergson's work. This appreciation has been greatly enhanced by reading his latest book, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* just issued. For here does Bergson not only lay the foundation for a new and lively sympathy on my part but he makes ineffective much of the criticism I had aimed at him by giving to the mystical experience of God a metaphysical ground, in the *élan vital*. Hence I am most happy to discover new points of contact and understanding with one for whom there has ever been the highest regard and the sincerest respect and friendliness.

I

The Aim of Bergson's Intuitionism

There is a cynical significance to the *bon mot*, now going the rounds, that a philosopher is a man who knows less and less about more and more, while a scientist is one who knows more and more about less and less. This significance might be put in the form of the following parable: To whom shall I liken this generation? It is like children playing in the market-place who have discovered a delicately coordinated watch. In the darkness of night one can tell the time by pressing a gadget whereupon certain chimes are set ringing which detail the minutes and the hours in tones of beauty and exactness.

But the children have no idea of time, and are bent upon scientific knowledge. Their first effort toward knowledge consists in gutting the watch. Since they know how to count, they set down with exactness the number of wheels and the cogs on the wheels, the pins and jewels, the springs and levers. They really never expected to get anything so complicated from what originally appeared so simple. In their great enthusiasm let us presume that while they are ignorant of time and refuse to admit that there can be any intelligent purpose in or behind the watch they proceed to publish a book filled with statistics about the watch and the mathematical relations that can be conceived as existing between cogs. But some of the children more scientific than the rest insist that they will know little about the watch until they have still further analyzed it. So these bray it in a mortar, treat it with acids, and, having reduced it to its lowest terms of chemical elements, coolly bring back the amazing information that now they know *all* about it—since it has been determined that what was picked up in the street consisted of so many grammes each of certain chemical atoms. They further make the astounding assumption that wherever one has these chemical elements present in correct proportion one will have an incipient watch needing only the passage of time and the law of permutation and combination to bring it about. The only reason they have for alleging this is the existence of this one watch. To the objection that chemical elements have never thus formed themselves into any other going concern they are not at all shaken in their dogmatic assurance but will answer that while no one has ever seen it done, one need only wait some millions of years and it would happen, because it has, or that one must wait until science has discovered some new active formula, because it will.

Present day science suffers from the poverty of looking on knowledge from the standpoint of a single method, that of statistics or of mathematics. This was due to the accident of having been found valuable by the Greeks, of being earliest

developed, and of offering freedom at the Revival of Learning from the theological dogmatisms of the Scholastics. As a result there grew up a dogmatism in science quite as complex and thorough-going as any with which Scholasticism bound fast the thinking of another age, in which, to refer again to our parable, all knowledge of the watch was foolishly assumed to be set forth in chemical statistics. How deeply this narrowed way of thinking has bitten into all our concepts of knowledge, and even into the social structure, we need but a few illustrations to prove. The vain effort to erect psychology into a science is a case in point. Science is the mathematical way of looking at things, and from its own standpoint is legitimate, valuable, and not to be condemned so long as we remain aware that the mathematical aspect of some facts or events may not be the only valuable aspects, and in some cases may have so little value as to be of no practical account. When, then, we insist, as some psychologists do, on looking at human behavior from the mathematical standpoint alone, we need to remember that we are gathering facts which may have no particular value in knowledge of the subject. Just as a knowledge of the chemical composition of the watch gives me from the standpoint of knowledge of the meaning "watch" the least valuable and least pertinent information, so the effort to reduce human activity to chemisms and behaviorisms may give me not only the least valuable facts about a person; they may, if I exercise any prediction whatever, yield only misinformation, because not applicable. This applies equally to much of social statistics, which give valuable direction but, in any particular case, no predictability at all. On the other hand, the more general the predictions the farther are they away from any valuable facts.

This incapacity of the mathematical method to yield valuable information is particularly true in everything that pertains to life. Not only does science, as a mathematical method of looking at things, not give us all that we can really know as the science of yesterday eagerly claimed; it cannot give us

much information about that half of the world which is most important for thinking beings. For perceiving and reflecting beings, a real knowledge of the watch, for instance, depends far more upon the purpose behind the watch, a knowledge of the meanings of which the hidden chimes are the symbols, an appreciation of time, than upon the chemical components. As a matter of fact, one might have complete scientific, mathematical, analytical knowledge, and know nothing of value about the watch. There are many existences which must be understood from the standpoint of synthesis. This is true of all life, even of the simplest organism. This is likewise the reason that biology has never been able to become in the strictest sense scientific.

I am not arguing against viewing facts from the mathematical standpoint of analysis; let us learn all we can about the chemical components of our watch, but let us have our minds open also to an entirely different set of facts, the facts of synthesis. *For life*, an organism of any kind, natural or artificial, synthesis can tell us what analysis is entirely at loss to explain.

This is the truth for whose challenge Bergson has spent his life and effort. If I am able to understand his philosophy at all, this is the very heart and soul of it. It is the reason for his distinction between intelligence and instinct. His quarrel is not, as is so often claimed, with intelligence, but with intelligence as the sole method of approach to knowledge. I feel that in the use of the term intelligence has come much of the misunderstanding of Bergson's philosophy. The word carries a prejudice. What seems unintelligible seems foolish. I am convinced he does not mean that. He means that certain facts are not susceptible to the analysis of the rationalizing intellect without destruction, just as the children of the street could not view the watch from the mathematical standpoint without pulverizing or dismantling or destroying the watch. These cogs and springs and pivots which they hold in their hands are doubtless facts, but they are not a watch, and they can never again be a watch until some synthesizing brain can relive the

original purpose and set them together again. The fall of Humpty Dumpty may be a legitimate scientific experiment, but not even all the King's horses, nor all the King's men, can transfer him back from scrambled egg to Humpty Dumpty. Not only so, but the most important facts, from some stand-points, have passed out in the scientific process, and passed forever beyond recall. It is like the scientific impasse illustrated in the recent book of C. G. Darwin, *The New Conception of Matter*, where, in discussing the quantum theory, he calls attention to the effect upon the atom of viewing the atom, that makes its action unpredictable. That is, the very process of analysis breaks down at last of its own weight, as what we think we see we know must be essentially quite different.

The aim of Bergson's intuitionism is to call our attention to the hitherto neglected method of knowledge which in the insect world, for instance, has developed as the sole method, with remarkable results for coordination and for the preservation and propagation of life. If man has followed the opposite direction of evolution, it has not been because he was entirely devoid of instinct but because in his scientific progress he has depended so largely upon a single means of apprehension. Living organisms owe their very existence to a capacity to realize things as a whole. And we have herein the two contrasting methods of science and philosophy.

As Dr. Carr once wrote in his *Philosophy of Change* (p. 19):

Philosophy starts from an intuition of reality, . . . its method is to seize this intuition in its purity and dilate it. The mind has the power of grasping by direct apprehension the reality of the universe as it is in itself and before it undergoes the shaping and forming and framing and moulding which the intellect imposes on it in order to fit it to serve the practical activity of our lives. This direct apprehension or intuition of reality is the method of philosophy. The new outlook therefore consists in this, first of all that there is a subject-matter of philosophy which is not, and cannot as such be, "the subject-matter of science, namely, the fundamental fact of life and consciousness, which is freedom, and also that there is a method of philosophy which is the very contrary of the method of science, namely, the

method of intuition."

And, writes Carr in another place,

"What is the knowledge that philosophy may and science cannot attain? What object is it that philosophy can comprehend but that science by its very nature cannot? We may answer in one word—freedom."

Thus I am not surprised that the loved figure with which we later became familiar, walking along the Quai d'Orsay or Voltaire, discovering that day in the shop-window Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and taking it home with him, dated from that event his intellectual conversion. What Bergson had really done was to provide a ground for philosophy so sadly bested since the days of Hume, which made it the complement of and assistant to rather than the opponent of science. Carr was ever ready to acknowledge his debt for this freeing process.

II

What Relation, if any, to Personalism

Some may inquire what may be the relation, if any, between the intuitionism of Bergson and the system of Personalism. Every man must be conceded the right to name his own philosophy. And Bergson is no exception. Without claiming him as a personalist, however, it may be allowable to show the close affinity toward philosophy of personalistic trend. The very heart and soul of Bergsonian philosophy resides in the doctrine of duration. Life is conceived by him not as a congeries of separable states or a succession of events, but a continuously moving zone of activity which carries its past along with it. We use the time-scale in order the better to study and define it, but reality will not stop for our definition; before we have defined it, or while defining it, it has moved on, become something else. Analysis can never give us this mobile reality. It deals only with a dead past. If we are to catch the significance of the living, it can only be by living in and with it—an act of intuition. Consequently duration is the heart of Bergson's concept. But to the personalist this some-

thing which can both rationalize with analysis and understand by living instructive experience, transcending experience for sake of analysis at the very moment it is immanent in experience, is best termed a person. He would, then, for Bergson's Duration substitute the term person, since to his thought the self-referring subject of experience is the only reality of which duration can be affirmed. To the person, past, present, and future present themselves as a singly related experience. Whether Bergson would readily grant this interpretation of his doctrine of duration is questionable, since he does not have the personalistic dislike of vagueness nor aversion to the indefiniteness of the impersonal.

On the further point of freedom, however, there can be no doubt. Both to the Personalist and to the philosopher of change freedom is an essential concept of reality, and each in his way lays out to guard this concept. It may be granted that the Bergsonian approach is more adroit and perhaps to many would be more convincing, since the personalist is likely to assume freedom as one of the necessary and inalienable experiences of existence, and to assume it as more or less self-evident in all experience. One further point, among many others, finds the personalist in strictest accord—that is, on the necessity of synthesis as a method of knowledge. Our earliest as well as our latest concepts deal with things as wholes, with situations as wholes, with ourselves as members of a social order, with an inner life that responds as a whole.

We have a reflection of these considerations in the new Gestalt psychology of Germany. In my childhood the best educational practice, and which claimed to be scientific, was to teach the child words by first teaching him letters. My father was drilled in spelling meaningless combinations of two or three letters before he was entrusted with whole words. It took a long time to get over the process of scientific analysis and learn that it was easier for a child to learn a whole word than it was to learn it by parts. In the same way, the mind takes in situations as wholes. There is comprehension even

before there is language in which to express it—and long, long before there has arisen the scientific power to analyze, that is, to break it up into constituent parts. Bergson and the personalists would certainly hold together in this, that understanding is functional in the very existence of mind and need not wait for analysis in order to know.

But there is still further analogy between personalism and the philosophy of change: Professor Bergson has just completed a startling work—startling from the advanced positions taken—which identifies it substantially with the positions of personalism. One winter afternoon in Paris I complained at the indefiniteness and impersonality of the philosophy of change regarding a world-ground. Professor Bergson then explained that he had something of that nature already under way. Now after more than fourteen years we have this accomplished in *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*—The two sources of morality and religion. Here Professor Bergson identifies the *élan vital* with the world-ground. It is no longer an impersonal push. It is a creative energy which can love and can desire love, which can create in purposive way. As such it may not fulfil the demands of an old-time theologian or of a fundamentalistic deist, but it fulfils exactly the demand of the personalist for what *he* calls a personal God, and in the assertion of which he is commonly misunderstood.

When he comes to the subject of dynamic religion, Bergson identifies it with the Christian mystical experience. In the mystical experience God becomes to the experiencer an *élan*, a power acting through the individual which throws itself into the greatest enterprises. Here a man realizes his highest joy by becoming a co-creator. The difficulty about the philosophic God has been that the God of philosophic thought was an anomaly—a being who could not, by the very terms in which he was defined, enter into relation with men. Thus it has come about that the sceptic, in attacking the notion of God, has only managed to destroy his own straw conception. Bergson

believes that if he really wants to know about God he should interrogate the mystic experience. The deep and genuine accord of the mystic experience in many cases and across many centuries is best explained, according to the author, by assuming the real existence of the Being with whom the mystic believes himself in communication. Further than this, the vital energy launched across matter, whether appearing from within or above consciousness, is one with consciousness and of the same kind. This *élan*, which in religion, in music, or in art is that something more than intelligence, that something more than understanding, is none other than the *élan vital*. This *élan vital*, or creative energy, is further personalized by being described as

A creative energy which would love and which desired to draw from itself beings worthy of love, could thus cast forth the worlds of matter to oppose the divine spirit that he might express simply the distinction between that which is created and that which creates.

Professor Bergson does not hesitate to take the extreme personalistic position that man represents the purpose of life on earth—"l'homme, qui est la raison d'être. . . ." Thus he prepares the way for the recognition of the existence of the soul. Here he sees that the same method has been used as was used in the case of the philosophic God—an illogical definition of the soul has been set forth which creates itself the problems that are raised. We should talk of God and of the soul only in terms of living experience. The physiological explanation of memory is insufficient. The soul must be taken as a unit of experiences, and from this we may conclude the possibility of its survival. At any rate he declares it is something to have obtained on the essential points a resulting probability which can change into certitude, and to have obtained for the knowledge of the soul and its destiny the possibility of a progress without end.¹

¹Mais c'est quelque chose que d'avoir obtenu, sur des points essentiels, un résultat d'une probabilité capable de se transformer en certitude, et pour le reste, pour la connaissance de l'âme et de sa destinée, la possibilité d'un progrès sans fin.

Could any standpoint be more satisfactory to a personalist than this?

I have already referred to the vigorous attack launched upon Bergson in the lecturer's more youthful days because of the impersonal character of his *élan vital*. Now Mr. Bergson replies in the most beautiful and definite terms, undermining most of those criticisms and showing himself the exponent of those tenets dear to philosophy—God, freedom, and immortality. Of his doctrine of freedom there never has been any doubt, and now there is none concerning his doctrine of God or of the enduring self. We were thrilled as we read the pages of *The Creative Evolution*, but *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* is the climax of Bergsonian thought.

III

Bergson's Place in Human Thought

Who that stands in the presence of any living man shall have the courage or the affrontery to assign him a place in the role of human thought with any confidence that his judgment will stand the tests of time? Time buries so many whose reputations have been vaunted in their own age, and silently resurrects those who have been forgotten by their very contemporaries.

Suffice to attempt to point out simply the relation which Bergson has held to the mental revolution of which we are all now a part. A recent reviewer, with more self-assurance than thoughtful judgment, has already consigned Bergson to the scrap-heap of dead systems, remembering only the time when, following his *Creative Evolution*, Bergson was good newspaper copy, and concluding, since he is no longer such, that his day is past. In my judgment his day is only beginning. The *Creative Evolution* was a land-mark in a new way of thinking about the universe which is only now becoming the vogue of scientific thinkers. Not only did Bergson at that time set a new fashion for thought; he has now completed his structure

with the metaphysical assumption. He has not come to this in the direct way so dear to the personalist, but his method should be more pleasing to the scientist, and he has arrived. Life is to him the supreme reality, and in its highest form it achieves the plane of personality.

Such a doctrine is not more likely to be popular today than it has been in the past, though the present humble attitude of scientific thinkers before the problems posed by relativity, by atomic meaning, by the quantum theory, to mention a few, is distinctly an advance over anything the world has seen since Bruno. And it may be that the day of deliverance is at hand and that Bergson is its prophet.

THE DYING HADRIAN ADDRESSES HIS SOUL

TRANSLATION BY THE LATE HERBERT WILDON CARR

*Animula vagula, blandula
Hospes comesque corporis
Quae nunc abibis in loca
Pallidula, rigida, nudula;
Nec, ut soles, dabis jocos?*

Kindly, wayward little soul,
My body's friend and guest,
Who now to bare, cold shades must fare;
Wilt thou not, as thy wont is,
Make thy jest?

THOUGHT AFFINITIES OF SCHELLING AND BERGSON

BY HERMAN HAUSHEER

The aim of this paper is to disclose the affinities of thought in Schelling's and Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology. First I shall offer a brief general outline of the historical introduction of Schelling's philosophy into France.

The historical roots of what is now termed the *Philosophy of Life* reach as far back as the middle of the eighteenth century. Rousseau's emphasis on feeling, in reaction against the excessive intellectualism of the *Enlightenment*, can rightly be considered as a defense of the natural, spontaneous life, liberated from its imposed restrictions and artificialities of civilization. The philosophy of life appeared at first in conscious, pregnant form in individuals like Hamann, Herder, F. J. Jacobi, Goethe, Schelling, Fichte and Schopenhauer. Of the German representatives it was Schelling only who exerted a pervasive influence upon minds beyond the confines of his country. He influenced especially the Danish thinker Soeren Kierkegaard, with whom German thought concerned itself very intensely during the first years after the World War. But Schelling's influence did above all insinuate itself into French speculative thought. Schelling's ideas penetrated through the mediation of Ancillon, Madame de Staël, Cousin and Ravaisson (both declared personal disciples of Schelling) into French philosophy. Schelling and Hegel were the rival stars of French philosophic reflection during the period before Cousin. The notices of Schelling and of Fichte which appear before the time of Cousin are extraordinarily hostile, only Kant is the favorite. Schelling's first work to be translated into French was his judgment of the philosophy of Cousin. It was Schelling's introduction to the German translation of Cousin's preface to his *Fragments Philosophiques* (Paris, 1835). It was not until 1842 that Schelling's *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus* was translated into French. Con-

trary to Kuno Fischer (*Schelling's Leben, Lehre und Werke*, p. 211 ff) Cousin only vaguely encouraged the works of Schelling. Schelling had also partly been presented to the scientific public. The long and detailed *History of Natural Science*, which was begun by Cuvier, devotes a whole section to his philosophy of nature. Schelling's philosophy of nature charmed the French because of its apparently scientific solution of opposites which science made no attempt to solve. The conquests of chemistry and electricity were catching the popular imagination in a way which anticipates the present-day fascination of psychology. Then, too, the appearance of a synthesis in Schelling's philosophy of nature was another point to win the French. He had dared to invest the idea of progress with the authority of science.

Historically there is no direct influence of Schelling's philosophy upon Bergson's intellectual evolution. Bergson never mentions Schelling in his works. In 1912, after the publication of his major works, Bergson declared that Schelling's works were unknown to him. Still, an indirect, yet lasting, influence of the greatest of German romanticist thinkers upon Bergson, is not difficult of proof. Ravaisson, a confirmed follower of Schelling, was his teacher.

Bergson not only continued the heritage of his teacher (Ravaisson), but transformed and constructed it into a new, original philosophy, which does not aim to be a closed system. In contrast to Schelling Bergson feels himself as a transition, as a predecessor. His philosophy is only "hypothesis". It seeks to determine the *method* which will lead by the co-operation of many minds to a true system (Creat. Evol. XIV). But the central philosophical problem—the reality of the absolute and its exclusive mode of knowledge is for him as it is for Schelling definitely settled. What the German philosopher, continuing the Kantian and Fichtean tradition, strives to articulate by means and in the language of rationalistic dialectic, Bergson, trained and versed as he is in the sciences, tackles and moulds by the aid and in the language of

our psychologically and biologically biased mentality.

Like Schelling, Bergson sets out on his philosophic quest from an *apriori* ultimate principle, which creates the universe, and which furnishes him the formula of life. By virtue of a close and sympathetic observation of the evolution of organic and psychical life we soon run up against the presence of a spiritual unity, interconnecting and constituting the basis of the multiplicity of visible living beings. In agreement with Schelling, Bergson conceives his philosophic task to consist in a life-like representation of the universe, which in its manifold divergent forms discloses an ultimate principle. Like him he makes continual use of the philosophical and scientific materials of his day, of which he is a past master, and which he analyzes in a critical and philosophical spirit. He candidly admits that he conceived the idea of his speculative construction as a result of a vivid extra-logical intuition (*Creat. Evol.* p. 191). Both thinkers agree that ultimate reality is dynamic in nature, an eternally creative force.

The real and ideal world emerge within time out of the conflict of two, originally self-identical, tendencies. The primitive active tendency is life or consciousness, while matter is the passive tendency. It was a specifically romantic idea to hypostatize individual consciousness into a cosmic principle. There is a close affinity between Schelling's and Bergson's organic view of nature. Bergson elucidates the original identity and ensuing divergence of the two major tendencies by the use of convincing metaphors (*Creat. Evol.* p. 247, 261). In absolute freedom—the creation of a world is a free act—life created matter, its own field of activity, out of its own inexhaustibleness. Matter is fossilized life. The relation of matter to life is as detension is to tension, as descent is to ascent. It is a movement opposed to life. Inert matter is subject to fixed laws. Life struggles against the determination of inert matter. It aims to regain its fallen counter-part, lift to itself, and carry as much freedom into its dependent condition as possible. But life itself has also to struggle against its own

tendency to inertia and materialization. The essence of the laws of matter will always be really external and strange to us (*Creat. Evol.* p. 204). The converse holds true for life. It alone is able to apprehend the consciousness identical with itself. The resistance of matter, there greater and here less, split the initial unitary stream into numberless divergent directions. Bergson emphatically denies that every organic manifestation of life belongs to a presupposed general plan. A very liberal allowance must be made for accidents in creative incidents. Life consists not of states, but of tendencies, tendencies which oppose and penetrate each other. Their incessant opposition manifests itself in the perpetual transformations of organic matter. Organic evolution becomes the more complex the more it advances. The past pressing against the present fecundates it to bring forth continually new forms, incommensurable with its predecessors. Nevertheless, the manifold divergent forms share in a harmony, a harmony grounded in the identity of the vital impetus. Their harmony proves itself by the fact that all forms, no matter how divergent, supplement each other. There is no manifestation of life which does not contain in a rudimentary state, either latent or potential, the essential characteristic of most other manifestations. The difference is in the proportions (*Creat. Evol.* p. 98, 104, 106). This is in agreement with Schelling's notion of the "natural forces", which differentiate themselves in their ideal and real content by a quantitative difference. Life is something infinite in possibilities, an unstable, prolific balance of thousands of tendencies, intimately interwoven. Out of the opposition of these tendencies arise new creations. Matter effects the division of the original unitary vital impetus. Matter splits in fact that which is a manifold only in possibility. The Bergsonian evolution of life displays the same parallelism of the ideal and real factors of being as the evolution of Schelling's subject-object. The ideal activity is for Bergson the creative activity which moulds the real activity (matter), which potentializes matter to even higher forms of organiza-

tion, and which finally culminates in the concrete spiritual form of life, the consciousness of man. The ideal series corresponds to Schelling's scheme of unconscious consciousness (vegetative and animal instinct) and actual consciousness (intellect). In opposition to Schelling Bergson denies the reality of a unilateral evolution of one potential out of another potential. Nevertheless, Bergson agrees that in a form of consciousness the rest of them are implicitly present. It is only the proportions that make the difference.

What Bergson terms life, duration, is in every form always something spiritual, psychical, something that we can always apprehend immediately in the form of our own ego. Thus Bergson's presuppositions for an absolute knowledge of another being is self-knowledge.

Our own self is the reality which every one can intuitively apprehend from within. The consciousness that we have of our own personality in its flowing through time, leads us into the inside of a reality which serves as a model for us to represent other realities. It is ourselves that we experience. Who cannot attain the intuition of the duration of his own being, it can be given him neither by concepts nor by images. The only thing a philosopher can do is to stimulate others to a definite endeavor in this direction. If we coerce ourselves—and here it becomes evident how intuition leaves behind the unconscious motive power of instinct—it becomes clear that the faculty of vision must become one with the act of will.

Schelling distinguishes between two forms of intuition: 1. A primordial intellectual intuition, possessed only by the absolute ego. 2. The creative or productive intellectual intuition, consisting of an *apriori* knowledge of the absolute and its evolutionary unfolding in the empirical world. Absolute self-knowledge is identical with the absolute. The absolute is its own object of knowledge. Its knowledge is identical with primordial intellectual intuition. Intellectual intuition in its primitive form, detached from every form of subjectivity, is inconceivable, incomprehensible, and can only be suggested by cir-

cumscription. In and for itself the absolute reveals nothing. It is only as it discloses its form in an act of self-reflexive knowledge that it becomes an object of intellectual intuition for an empirical ego (*Werke*, IV, 305, 369, 376; VI, 137; VII, 148.) The productive intellectual intuition sets in as the absolute passes from its quiescent primordial state into its dynamic process of self-unfolding, the evolution of the universe.

As in Schelling there are two species of intuition in Bergson's philosophy: a primordial and a reconstructive intuition. The primordial intuition is the above mentioned self-knowledge which lifts one's own experience, duration, into the sphere of consciousness. If this intuition objectifies itself then the idea of the constructed object becomes identical with the duration of its creator. The poet conceives in an act of inner vision the basic idea of his poem. In consequence it is given him to construct and order the symbols or words accordingly. The symbolic representation is for Bergson a redescension. Reconstructive intuition plays a much larger part in Bergson's philosophy than primordial intuition. Its domain of knowledge is infinite, includes everything that represents living thought. The intuition of another being or object is the understanding of its significance, its meaning, of that which differentiates it from everything else. It is, even if dependent upon the medium of sense-perception, a something which no diligent analysis discovers, something purely ideal, that is felt and experienced. The thing itself, the object, becomes in intuitive consideration a personality. Intuition is always orientated towards the psychical. It establishes a *communication sympathétique* between the object and the observer. Bergson's intuition is the reconstitution of the contact of two variable durations, whereby the interrupted continuity of life, caused by intellect and matter, is restituted at one place. As intuition conceives ever new ideas, and opens up in the observation of nature ever new points of view, it is of the greatest value as a tool of scientific investigation. Scientific investigation starts

initially with an intuition, and receives its material from it. Intellect immediately analyzes the vital unity into inert parts which it later recombines into purposive relations. But the synthesis of parts can never reconstitute the primordial unity. No synthesis of carefully analyzed psychic factors can recover the original image of man which a simple intuition furnishes. The path leads from intuition to intellectual work of thought; but never is the converse true. Hence for Schelling as for Bergson the metaphysical, biological and psychological considerations are only so many diverse points of view under which the absolute is viewed.

The basic presupposition of Schelling's and Bergson's philosophy is faith in an absolute, which lives as a metaphysical essence in all its ideal and real phenomenal forms. The assertion of an absolute implies its possible knowledge. The unconditional absolute, the presupposition and source of categories, the faculty of knowledge as such, is not accessible to sense-perception and categorial thought. It can only be apprehended by a form of knowledge which inversely ascends the path of thought until it reaches its origin, where the two in conventional thought differentiated factors of knowledge, intuition and reflexion, are yet in an undifferentiated identity, where knower and known are still fused into one. This form of knowledge, whose pure mysticism deprives it of every normative determination, is the intellectual intuition of Schelling and the intuition of Bergson.

In Schelling's philosophy predominates the view that intellectual intuition is a *fact* of knowledge. With Bergson intuition is primarily a *methodological principle* of knowledge. Schelling's intellectual intuition is a *dogma*, a world view elucidated by the use of that which the Germans prefer to term *Geisteswissenschaften*. Bergson's intuition is rather a *tentative* and *provisional regulative principle* of investigation. An examination of the domains of knowledge of Schelling's intellectual intuition and Bergson's intuition shows this clearly. The cognitive realm of Schelling's intellectual intuition is com-

pletely circumscribed in its content as well as in its extent by its deduction, and exhibited in all its details. It is a closed, eternally self-identical something, the universal law of reason, the immutable ideal content of the universe in its evolution in the ideas. It is the peculiar characteristic of intellectual intuition that it points back to the unity in the origin of things. Intellectual intuition constitutes for Schelling the completed philosophy as such, especially there where he strictly defines its concept in contrast to empiricism. The realm of knowledge of intellectual intuition is achieved in an anamnesis, that is, its view is retrospectively oriented.

Bergson's intuition views this historic retrospect only as a preparatory act. It immediately orients itself in the direction of the imminent future. Its realm of knowledge is the living universe in all its ideal and corporeal individual self-manifestations. There is neither a limit nor a repetition in this eternally continuous creativity. Every individual has its own essence, which is only a part of the essence of life. It has its own law, which is only a letter in the cosmic laws. This individual law, the duration of the object, has its place in the infinite realm of absolute knowledge, and constitutes the aim of an intuition that continually searches for new points of view.

The acts of Schelling's intellectual intuition and Bergson's intuition lie in totally divergent planes. The former is on the plane of conceptual construction, while the latter is on the plane of concrete actuality. The one is rationalistic, and the other radically empirical and positivistic. The extent of intellectual intuition ends with the construction of the ideas emanating from the absolute. For every constructive thought and intuition there is a hiatus between the ideal and the empirical-temporal world. Schelling stringently affirms this, while Bergson denies it. For him intuition serves only the grounding of its own infinite task. The intuited object constitutes the immanent essence of the absolute in concrete and psychical things. Intuition creates the metaphysics of the empirical sciences, of the individual objects by a perpetual progress.

Schelling's intellectual intuition is given. In none of its forms is the individual really active. Not we have reason, but reason has us: not we construct, but the absolute constructs in us. Intellectual intuition is an entirely passive and receptive self-surrender to revelation, which the average man cannot attain by effort. That is, the whole process and content of intellectual intuition unrolls itself in the shrouded atmosphere of mysticism (*Werke* I, 324; IX, 65, 229).

For Bergson intuition is acquired and developed. In its origin it is mystical; but as a method its mysticism is almost wholly stripped. Intuitive knowledge is not obtained as an unearned gift. It requires a heightened state of consciousness, a highly tensioned wakefulness. As a method intuition implies a sharp discernment and differentiation of the forms of thought and activity, of knowledge and action, of speculation and practice. "There is nothing mysterious in this faculty", Bergson is able to write with greater justification than Schelling. "Every one of us has had occasion to exercise it to a certain extent" (Intro. to *Metaph.* 89). Intuition is the Archimedean point of convergent series of thoughts, gained by intimate observation of experience. It is a fulminating understanding of the living, concrete unity of things, embracing the whole as an achievement of mental toil and of wide knowledge. It is thus a climax, only attained by an utmost effort and concentration of mind. It is the absolutely new point of view which corresponds to the antecedents of its preparatory work as the fruit corresponds to the flower.

It is the necessary consequence of the view that intuition always extracts and crystallizes from the objects the absolutely new, the unique, the unrepentive, that the conventional as well as the prevailing language of philosophic thought is largely unsuitable to the denotation of intuitively cognized facts. The intuitive method thus implies a method of etymology, the need of the creation of a new language. Bergson repeatedly maintains that the symbols of present-day language provide a paltry expression to knowledge intuitively attained. He demands

the construction of new concepts "very different from those which we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition"; "fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its sinuosities and of adopting the very movement of the inward life of things" (Intro. to *Metaph.* 9, 21, 69, 37). The construction of language is a self-understood, integral task of every new and progressive science as soon as it no longer reflects about the problem; but seeks to determine its own inner form. A philosophy centered in the concept of life probably never will succeed in fully fitting its purely intuitive knowledge into every form of representation. The farther it advances in the direction of symbolization, the more it will tend to deviate from its primary ground of pure intuition, and its pure content will slowly fade away. Bergson himself has grasped this difficulty; but to-date no word has come from him how to surmount it. I find no pure examples of pure concepts in his philosophy, though there is plenty of elasticity in the meanings applied to his general concepts discoverable in his various writings. In this respect he has made considerable advance beyond Schelling, while the dilemma remains.

Schelling conceals the mooted and problematic points of his philosophy under the protective wings of mysticism. Philosophy, he contends, is essentially esoteric (*Werke* II, 232). Hence it is impossible for him to pen a lucid report about the universe (*Werke* IV, 402). As a matter of fact the subject of his philosophy is part and parcel of a sphere which eludes conventional forms of cognition and language of speech. It requires a "language of the spirit" (*Werke* I, 347); for to express the eternal by mortal words is difficult, as language is derived from images and created by intellect (*Werke* I, 303).

The objectified intellectual intuition of Schelling consists in the self-representation of the absolute through the medium of the unconsciously active artist. Bergson's aesthetic intuition

constitutes, on the other hand, a highly potentialized ability of spiritual vision. Schelling's aesthetic intuition unites the conceptually constructed ideal world with the real world. Here also the mystical element preponderates. The artist sees in the object nature the individual form of expression of the absolute, to him the finite is the plastic image of the infinite. Genius, which is for aesthetics the same as what the absolute is for philosophy, namely, what itself is never objective, but is the cause of all that is objective, empowers the artist to create a plastic representation of that which the philosopher can express only in abstract concepts. The product of aesthetic intuition is to intellectual intuition what action is to thought. Both artist and philosopher are mere instruments of the absolute in their moments of creativity; the superindividual acts in and through them. The artist is the pencil of the absolute with which it sketches in terms of a new language and a new form the eternal law of nature. The unique differential characteristic of both artist and thinker consists in the perceptual integration and differentiation of the absolute and individual.

A parallel to Bergson is only possible if we ignore the mystical element of creative art, and if we limit ourselves to a consideration of Bergson's naturalistic view that aesthetics is a special ability of spiritual vision. Art is only a purer vision of reality. The stress of aesthetic intuition consists in the extreme in an entirely non-mystical differentiation of perceptibility (*Le Rire* 153-4). For Bergson there is between the artist and the average man only a relative and gradual difference; but with Schelling the difference is radical and essential.

How is the truth of intuitive knowledge validated? Usually in the verification of experience, or in the analysis of the originally discovered synoptic unity.

The absolute *apriori* certainty of intellectual intuition, which Schelling considered as the sole organ of scientific knowledge, forces him to place little value upon the verifications of its stipulations. Experience has no share in the acquisition of knowledge. It has still less part in its verification.

Experience is for Schelling never more than a supplementary and accidental confirmation of a spiritual and ideal tendency, which previously was gained by a general speculative view point.

Bergson's continuous intuitive method, the method that achieves everything, requires an equally continuous control. It is continually dependent upon experience. Thus Bergson demands that "science (intuition) passes immediately to analysis, which multiplies to infinity its observations of an object from outside points of view" (Introd. to *Metaph.* 32-33). "Dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts and be so propagated to other men; but all it does, often enough, is to develop the result of that intuition which transcends it" (*Creat. Evol.* 238). Analysis must, therefore, "find a mode of expression and of application which conforms to the habits of our thought" (Introd. to *Metaph.* 73).

Schelling entertained two disparate views about the nature of intellectual intuition. A predominant but not exclusive view was that intellectual intuition is a purely superconceptual construction. Schelling also had the theory that intellectual intuition is nothing but the determination to preserve the contact with living and actual nature. There are, however, only passing intimations of this view in his works. (*Werke* VII, 64.) Had Schelling adhered to this view which is so much more in harmony with Bergson, he would have had to extricate himself from his Fichtean presuppositions, which logically compelled him to stress the disjunction and bifurcation of the ideal and real world.

The original view which Schelling tenaciously held to throughout his philosophic career, be it as absolute knowledge or a revelation, lifts the whole system upon a plane which is totally divorced from actual reality. Schelling's realm of ideas and intuition resembles Plato's intuition of ideas, Plotinus' vision of the One, and the beatific vision of the mystics; inaccessible to profane minds and distant from the world of

sense-perception. This realm is the only object of the intuitive vision of the philosopher whose mystic grace consists in the fact that the absolute substance identical with the ideas, assumes individual and human forms of consciousness, and thus becomes partially expressible in terms of empirical reason and language.

Schelling's second form of intellectual intuition opposed to the above view lingers entirely in the background. It is really a foreign body in his system, and external to his static and dogmatic ontology. His original view precludes every possibility of an advance along philosophical and scientific lines. The second view is mentioned only occasionally as a method of scientific knowledge. It is never definitely determined, nor specifically discussed. Intuition according to this view is intimately rooted in what is temporal. It implies a vision of the "supersensible in the sensible"; but Schelling never saw its full significance. In spite of every endeavor Schelling could never recover the concrete level of experience.

This is the exact point which separates Bergson from Schelling. They share in common the conception of their point of departure—the *a priori* initial and ultimate principle, the kinship of their deduction of the metaphysical ground, the determination of the object of intuition, the skilful and ingenious use of actual and seemingly certain scientific facts in the construction and grounding of their bold speculations. Bergson introduces with decisiveness and consequence his view of intuition as an instrument of the concrete world. Both Schelling's and Bergson's philosophies are oriented towards the absolute. But Schelling prescribes to the absolute its form of being, and yokes it to a closed circle. He prides himself that he succeeded in this. "A system is complete if it leads back to its initial point of departure" (*Werke* III, 628). Bergson's philosophic faith is the faith in an infinite dynamism of the absolute, that the absolute can only be apprehended in its uniquely occurring manifestations. A closed intuitive system of thought, embracing the infinity of the universe is for Bergson an impossi-

bility. His method serves as a task which is ever new, and whose problems are as numerous as births are in organic nature.

It is the historical merit of Schelling that he elevated intuition to eminence as a principle of knowledge, and brought it to discussion on a philosophical plane. There is no philosophical system that does not mention intuition, nor is there one that disputes its value as a factor in cognition; but no system has liberated the cognitive character of intuition from its lurid indeterminateness, or from its religious amalgamation. No previous system discussed and defended the special nature and task of intuition. Schelling's original and exalted view of intellectual intuition brought it about that the problem of intuition has remained the constant stimulus of philosophic speculation since his time in spite of the general neglect of his philosophy.

French philosophy has taken over the most fertile and the least developed part of Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition. It is the great merit of Bergson that he replanted the less developed Schellingian notion of intuition among the ideas of our time, and thus assured it an evolutive continuance. There is no doubt that Bergson continues the heritage of Schelling. We have seen that there are some intimate affinities between him and Schelling; but what was mere assertion in Schelling's system, receives in Bergson's philosophy its empirical foundation. His neo-spiritualism differs from Schelling's idealism by its bold positivistic grounding, its freedom from dogmatism, and its illustrious patience of completion.

BERGSON AND THE ART OF LIFE

BY MARJORIE S. HARRIS

M. Henri Bergson seems to Mr. Santayana quite detached from reality but that same charge has been made against the French thinker's critic. At this point, one is reminded of the statement that Peter's opinion of Paul depends more on Peter than on Paul. Also one wonders how many great philosophers, since the time of Thales, have escaped the accusation of being "star-gazers", "useless pilots", men detached from concern with reality. In fact the author of a recent book, drawing more on his imagination than on historical data, has been at great pains to show that thirty great philosophers have not been sufficiently "tough-minded" to deal with certain of the real situations of life and have turned to what he erroneously regards as philosophizing in order to escape from difficulties. They have spun their own worlds, as did Bacon's spider. In such worlds, they, like Leibniz's monads, "dream their own dreams". We are reminded that the view of these men is: "Hätten wir das Leben, hätten wir keine Philosophie nötig." One wonders whether this is not just another Peter-Paul case. Rather than accuse the philosopher of lack of comprehension of the real, one may well ask himself whether he should not direct that censure against the "man of affairs"; whether the so-called practical individual is not the one who moves in a world detached from reality. May it not be true that only the philosophically minded—using the term with the connotation given it by Plato in discussing the qualities of his philosopher-king—can penetrate to the heart of reality?

It seems to me that one philosopher who answers to this description of the philosophic nature is M. Bergson. If this be true, Mr. Santayana's charge is without foundation. While the philosophical theories expounded by the great French philosopher differ, in certain cases, from those to which I subscribe, yet I return again and again to the reading of his works with enthusiasm and the reason to which I ascribe this peren-

nial interest is that he does have an insight into reality that renders his writings most suggestive.

It should be recalled that for Bergson reality is dual: is life and matter. It is with the former that I am concerned here, but only, however, with the significance that Bergson's concept of life has toward an *ars vivendi*.

And what connotation does Bergson give *life*? To answer this question, I shall give a résumé of Bergson's thought concerning certain aspects of life and I am trusting that, in making this summary as brief as possible, I shall not do injustice to his thought. In the first place, we are told that the inner life is qualitative in aspect and any attempt to express it quantitatively tends to treat the unextended as extended.¹ "The inner life is all this at once: variety of qualities, continuity of progress, and unity of direction."² A second point to note is that life is spontaneity and, therefore, unforeseeable. The new is the result of the life process. Thus, "That each instant is a fresh endowment, that the new is ever upspringing, that the form just come into existence (although, *when once produced*, it may be regarded as an effect determined by its causes) could never have been foreseen— . . . all this we can feel within ourselves and also divine, by sympathy, outside ourselves."³ Hence, "with life there appears free, unpredictable movement."⁴ Even in the vegetable world there is "the creation of unforeseen forms which are veritably works of art."⁵ In other words, novelty is an essential aspect of life. Moreover, as is already implied in our second point, life is creative. Thus, "the vital order is essentially creation."⁶ And the accompaniment of this creation is joy. Again, as has been implied in the second and third points, life is freedom.⁷ Finally life is solidarity. "Among the dissociated individuals, one life

¹Cf., *Time and Free Will*, pp. 3, 4, 7.

²*Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 15.

³*Creative Evolution*, p. 164. cf., *Matter and Memory*, pp. 297, 331.

⁴*Mind-Energy*, p. 17.

⁵*Creative Evolution*, p. 230.

⁷Cf., *Creative Evolution*, pp. 48, 264, and also *Mind-Energy*, p. 25.

goes on moving.”⁸ “Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which rises.”⁹ Such is the unity of life, which is at once essentially qualitative in aspect, and free in its creation of the new and unforeseeable.

From this hasty résumé of points made by Bergson with regard to the nature of life, we turn to a more detailed study of these points in order to determine their meaning for a philosophy of life.

First as to the qualitative aspect of life, it is evident that only an adequate philosophy of the inner life will reveal to us its nature. If we remain merely at the scientific point of view, we shall do injustice to the essence of that concrete life. We shall be disregarding the fact that “every physical state, simply because it belongs to a person, reflects the whole of a personality.”¹⁰ We shall be neglecting “that special coloring of the personality which can not be expressed in known and common terms.”¹¹ This does not mean that Bergson fails to recognize the valuable contribution that men who study the mind scientifically may make to the philosophical study. Indeed the science of mind is a step toward the philosophical comprehension of its nature. This insight of Bergson is in accord with that of Hegel and many other philosophers. While, then, the scientific data gathered concerning mental phenomena are real contributions to a theory concerning the nature of the inner life, we must realize with Bergson the limitations of an estimate of that nature based merely on such a study.

More specifically, whenever we try to express the relations to each other of psychical phenomena in quantitative terms, we are treating those phenomena as if they bore to each other the relation of container to contained, as if these phenomena were spatial in character, as if they were, therefore, measurable; yet they are not. Thus it is perfectly true that one has

⁸*Creative Evolution*, p. 258-9.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 269.

¹⁰*Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 25.

¹¹*Ibid.*

more intense pain when one's tooth is pulled than when a hair is pulled; it is perfectly true that the artist gets "more intense pleasure from the picture of a master than from the sign board of a shop". But the pain felt when the tooth is pulled is not just a multiple of the pain felt when a hair is pulled; nor is the pleasure experienced in looking at a masterpiece just a certain multiple of the pleasure experienced in looking at a sign board—we might add: especially when the latter pleasure is *nil* or a minus one, were this not aside from the point. What is true of these physical experiences is also true of other aspects of the mental life. Thus,

"the greater number of emotions are instinct with a thousand sensations, feelings, or ideas which pervade them; each one is then a state unique of its kind and indefinable, and it seems that we should have to re-live the life of the subject who experiences it if we wished to grasp it in its original complexity."¹³

If one grants that Bergson is correct here, then one must conclude that there are some so-called scientific experiments to test the emotions that utterly fail of their purpose. For example, an immature student, subjected to abnormal and trying conditions and given to understand that he is abnormal if he feels any repugnance to these, is receiving no real test of the emotions, but, rather, a severe, emotional shock. Such procedure seems all the more futile and inexcusable when one realizes that a scientific study of the emotions can not reveal their concrete nature.

Furthermore, there is a tendency among scientists who study the mind to classify and label individuals and so miss just those characteristics which make them unique. This tendency to superficial classification is, of course, also a trait of primitive emotion. As Mr. Buermeyer has shown, primitive emotion lives in a melodramatic world in which one's friends are good and one's enemies evil. There is a sharp line of demarkation between the sheep and the goats. In a similar way, investigators of mental phenomena often think abstractly. In general, the scientific study of the mind faces a dilemma if its

¹³*Time and Free Will*, pp. 17-18.

conclusions are taken as definite. To be strictly scientific, it must reduce mental phenomena to quantitative terms and hence its results no longer represent mental phenomena but only an abstract phase of them.

Our first conclusion, then, is that one must not take the findings of the psychologist too seriously—he does that for himself—since one can not arrive at the essence of the inner life through psychological findings alone. Nor can one discover the nature of the living, in general, through science. Indeed,

“it must be understood that the further it (science) penetrates the depths of *life*, the more symbolic, the more relative to the contingencies of action, the knowledge it supplies us becomes.”¹⁴

Consequently, the need arises for philosophy to make more concrete the quantitative, and thus abstract, findings of science.

In the second place, life has spontaneity.

“If we could view the evolution of life in its entirety, the spontaneity of its movement and the unforeseeability of its procedures would thrust themselves on our attention.”¹⁵

This thought of the unpredictability of the future is one that has given Bertrand Russell a chance for a very clever comment. He says that, if one were to read a poem many times and eventually decided that any further reading would mean boredom, he might not know “all the niceties and shades of boredom” that he would feel but he would know enough to influence his decision. Yet *ennui* is not the only result of repetition. Discovery may be just as truly the result of a continued repetition of an experiment. The man who bemoans the fact that the future holds no novelty, that “I’ve washed and dressed ten thousand times and all’s to do again”; who sees the future only as “to-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow” that creep “in this petty pace from day to day to the last syllable of recorded time,”—such a man surely finds that “life’s but a walking shadow”. But there is some special reason for this melancholia; there certainly was in the case of

¹⁴*Creative Evolution*, pp. 198-9.

¹⁵*Mind-Energy*, p. 29.

Macbeth. He was determined that the new be a repetition of the old: that there be crime after crime to establish him more firmly in power. He did not anticipate the unforeseeable that did occur and it was most unwelcome. But for many, the reasonable hope, held out by Bergson, of some novelty may overcome the pessimism induced by the fear that the future will be as the past. Thus Ibsen's "lady from the sea" came to feel that, were she released from her husband, she might have relief from the long-continued mental trouble caused by the memory of the "stranger". In general, when things-as-they-are become difficult to endure, the assurance that the unforeseeable will arise may help in one's adjustment to life—even though the new may just as surely turn out to be "hazardous and perilous" as desirable—for the latter is not always assured.

Closely allied to this point is another important one to note with regard to this essential phase of life and it is as follows: the intellect can not grasp the new and unpredictable. What the intellect tries to do is to put the new into old molds and "all molds crack." The significance of the new is lost. Bergson does well to warn against the attitude of mind that imposes ready-made categories on new experience. We would not call this attitude of mind *intellectualistic*, however, unless we use the term with the connotation given it by Bergson. We are perfectly familiar with that attitude of mind which, when jealousy is aroused, sees, in every act of its object, some further evidence of infidelity. Such was Othello's attitude toward Desdemona. We are familiar with the friendly advice not to cross a bridge until we come to it. That advice is offered to counteract the tendency to fear too much future events when one has not sufficient evidence that they will be unsatisfactory. The supreme egoist in Barrie's *The Twelve Pound Look* thought of himself in quite different terms than those which the reader would use in describing him. Pride and ambition blinded him so that he could not see the failure that he had made of himself. In each case cited, it is an emo-

tional rather than an intellectual attitude which establishes a certain point of view and prevents one from appreciating either the new in the situation or the possibility of novelty. However, we would agree with Bergson that any attitude of mind—whether ideational or emotional—that prevents one from seeing the essence of the new is insidious.

To understand the new experience, then, we must learn to sink ourselves in that experience and let it progressively reveal itself to us. One must not allow himself to be blinded by preconceptions. Yet there is this caution. To be truly empiricistic one must learn from past experience as well as future. There are certain molds that are helpful in meeting a new situation. The Micawber attitude assumes that a ship will come in whether or not one has sent a ship out. Past experience shows that someone must have sent a ship out. Men were caught in the stock market recession of Oct. 24, '29 because they assumed that certain old economic theories would not apply to the new experience. They disregarded these old theories to their sorrow. Young persons learn most sadly that love is not enough—if by *love* is meant mere sentimental passion. The pity is that these persons can not learn it from the past experience of the race. In short, there are circumstances in which ways of thinking based on past experience may prove helpful and one can not disregard them if his future experience is to be as significant as it should.

Moreover, life is creative and joy accompanies creation. It should be noted that, according to M. Bergson, pleasure accompanies the attainment of temporal goods—such as riches and position—whereas joy accompanies the attainment of what has more ultimate value. Thus,

“joy always announces that life has succeeded, gained ground, conquered. All great joy has a triumphant note. . . . Wherever there is joy, there is creation; the richer the creation, the deeper the joy.”¹⁶

Bergson goes on to say that the exceptional joys are those

¹⁶*Mind-Energy*, p. 29.

of the artist "who has realized his thought" and of the thinker "who has made a discovery". But the moral man is a creator in the highest degree because his "action, itself intense, is always capable of intensifying the actions of other men, and, itself generous, can kindle fires on the hearths of generosity."¹⁷ The moral man reaches the highest goal of human endeavor, which is the creation of the self by the self.

This is a timely message for any age and especially for our own. It is timely not so much because Bergson shows that joy is only an accompaniment of the attainment of one's goal and not the goal itself. That was indicated by Plato and Aristotle and reiteration of the point does not seem to impress those who are bent on pleasure. It is timely because it shows the real significance of goodness—the goal of human endeavor is the "creation of the self by the self". The good man is not an anomaly, a parasite, a being to be merely tolerated by the vigorous denizens of the world of action; but

"it is in studying these great lives, in striving to experience sympathetically what they experience, that we may penetrate by an act of intuition to the life principle itself."

In other words, these men penetrate to the life principle itself. This is a point that needs stressing when the dynamic power of goodness seems so little understood even by some philosophical thinkers.

Furthermore, the thought that the goal of life is a creation of the self by the self is not at all new but it is a truth that needs further affirmation now when, even in academic circles, external goods such as praise and fame are sought after. The means employed is that of saying or writing some new thing, which the mob has never tired of hearing—witness the experience of St. Paul, who found that "all the Athenians, and strangers which were there, spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing." A college president has maintained that the person who sugar-coats what he teaches through saying what is novel is really a greater asset

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 32.

to the college than the plodding scholar. Yet we can not arrive at the truth except through the "hard labor of the notion"—a fact that seems to be forgotten by the aggressively progressive part of our academic world. Consequently we are showered today with stories of science and stories of philosophy and stories of mankind. The one story at present lacking would be, if written, a tragedy for it would tell of the fallacies current in the minds of the reading and listening public. Furthermore, these spectacular novelists—using the word in its etymological sense—require praise, just as all sophists have, from the days of the first ones. Bergson says that praise is necessary only for the man who is not sure of himself. The man who really achieves needs no praise. As against this view that the new *per se* is desirable, Bergson has shown that the new must be a real creation to be significant and the highest creation is that of the self by the self. Mere novelty, then, is not enough for the philosopher who promises that the new will be a result of the life process. There must be an act of creation. The artist creates a picture "by drawing it from the depths of his soul." In general, "in the composition of a work of genius . . . we do indeed stretch the spring of our activity to the utmost." And in the intense action of the moral man, "a creator in the highest degree", there is communicated intensity to the action of others. In short, "the self at its fullest stretch" is necessary to bring about what is really new.

In the fourth place, life is freedom. But real freedom is not often obtained, for one is really free only when he puts his whole self in arriving at a decision. There are many acts that are practically automatic. Then there are cases in which our "sluggishness and indolence" prescribe our course of action, or cases in which we are overruled by friends in making decisions. There are times, however, when the whole or fundamental self makes the decision. Only then are we really free. There is here no indication that real freedom is beyond the reach of anyone. But the exercise of freedom may have momentous consequences. Bergson tells us that

"all that is serious in life comes from our freedom. The feelings we have matured, the passions we have brooded over, the actions we have weighed, decided upon and carried through, in short, all that comes from us and is our very own, these are the things that give life its oft-times dramatic and generally grave aspect."¹⁹

Illustrations of this point made by Bergson are numerous.

Sophocles's Electra chose to maintain an attitude of hostility toward her mother and her mother's husband and to try to avenge her father's death. As a consequence, she was treated as a slave. Had she bent to the will of the rulers, she might have lived the easy, comfortable life that was the lot of her sister, Chrysothemis. Electra, too, might have received gifts like those that delighted her sister. Chrysothemis's attitude was the prudent one. But Electra's whole self revolted against such adjustment to circumstances, for it seemed cowardly to her. She preferred to live "in evil case" than to fawn as did Chrysothemis. A similar example is seen in the choice of Antigone, who took what seemed to her the path of duty in spite of the dreadful doom to which she knew it led. She preferred it to the path of ease that might have been hers as it was that of her sister, Ismene. Faust and Macbeth and Othello brought upon themselves the tragedies that overwhelmed them. Ibsen's Hilmer made no attempt to see things from other than an ego-centric point of view. He was anxious to be known as up-right and self-reliant, according to conventional standards. Rostand's Roxane required in a lover both a pleasing face and the ability to make eloquent protestations of love. Hence she shut herself away from the possibility of being happy with the only man she could really have loved. In a word, all these *dramatis personae* brought tragedy upon themselves.

It is well to ponder carefully on Bergson's insight regarding the correct placing of responsibility for the serious situations that one meets. It is especially well since the age-old fallacy still persists—the idea that responsibility for an un-

¹⁹ *Laughter*, p. 79.

toward outcome may be attributed to "the woman whom Thou gavest to be with me", or to the demands of society, if one is to make good in the accepted sense, or to any other agency than oneself. When the tragedy overtakes one, it is possible, at times, to use Bergson's recommendation for meeting it: to treat the whole as if it were a puppet show. Cyrano did not do exactly that but he could see the incongruity in certain situations, he could give cheer, and he kept his white plume unspotted. Roxane, on the other hand, needed to change her self-centered attitude. Macbeth lived perhaps too much as if the world were a puppet show. And there are many others who have needed to see things as they really are in order to make the proper adjustments, rather than to see all as a puppet show.

Finally, life is a unity which subdivides itself into individuals, although "neither the category of unity or of multiplicity is appropriate since they both apply to inert matter." This doctrine of unity gives us, Bergson thinks, "more power to act and to live". It will be recalled that, since the Master of Men tried to imbue his followers with the thought of their unity with each other, various thinkers have expressed the principle in diverse ways and have suggested means of helping mankind to such a point of view. Mill, for example, hoped that children could be taught the unity of mankind so young that the thought would become an integral part of their attitude toward their fellows. One has but to read the daily paper to see how far short we are from such realization. Might we not add that present forms of communism lack most that insight? The unity of communism, in its present forms, is too abstract to be deserving of that name. In true unity the individual is inviolate for the unity is not one of identity but a unity in variety, as Hegel and others have shown.

If there exists implicitly such a fundamental unity, why does one not encounter it in experience, or why is it not an integral part of his experience? Is it not true that the unity has to be made explicit by individuals? As each monad must fulfil its

function if Leibniz's world were to be preserved, so each individual needs to explicate through his activity this fundamental truth. Yet individuals are still, for the most part, too pre-occupied with feelings, or ideas, or courses of action that are the results of an ego-centric and abstract point of view. Bergson's is a new voice to point us toward a more adequate *ars vivendi*.

Bergson, the philosopher of the new and unforeseeable, would free us from erroneous preconceptions that limit our activity, would help us toward a really free, creative life, a life in which the attempt is to make explicit the consequences of this unity with the rest of life. We turn from a reading of his works with the realization that they are inspired by the one ardent desire to reach the truth at all costs. This search has meant to him a sacrifice of much friendly intercourse. In his search, he has come so near to the light that, through his writings, old truths assume new significance and new truths illumine the paths of his readers. Our contemplation of the life principle thus raises us toward a point of view from which we can more adequately see things *sub specie aeternitatis*.

I HEARD WILD-GEESE

BY JOHN RICHARD MORELAND

I heard wild-geese pass swiftly over,
I saw the daffodils unfold;
Watched the green fires of grass and clover
Flame with the dandelion's gold.

My pot-bound faith stripped off its husk
And blossomed white as crocus flower
Whose flame consumed doubt's lingering dusk
In that miraculous April hour.

IV. MAN'S FUTURE ON THE EARTH

BY F. C. S. SCHILLER

What light has our survey of biological history thrown on the mystery of progress? Not very much, it would seem, at first sight. We have been able to associate progress with the occurrence of certain intrusive novelties, which have lifted life on to a higher plane, at intervals. But from the nature of the case this mode of genesis cannot yield any *guarantee* of progress. For novelty being unpredictable in essence, we cannot assume that the variation it entails will lead to progress rather than deterioration. And we have not dared to postulate a teleological agency directing the flow of variations. So we are apparently as far as ever from the discovery of any law of progress.

We may, however, detect a *law of acceleration* pervading history. Evolution is somehow speeding up. The rate of change is clearly increasing, and changes come at shorter intervals. Also, novelties now spread over the surface of the earth with greater rapidity—for good and for evil. But this acceleration also is not the clue we seek; it rebounds to the benefit of deterioration as easily as of betterment.

Though thus baffled, we may, however, continue to cherish the suspicion that the variations which have mediated progress were not really accidental. They have been too valuable, and have come too often and too appositely in the nick of time, to have been fortuitous. They may really have been as “providential” as they look to us. This is a suggestion not to be brusquely put aside. If more weight is not put upon it than it can bear, it will be right and well to keep it in mind: but we must not deceive ourselves as to how much it can prove. It cannot amount to demonstrative proof; at best it can yield growing probability. This, however, should not dismay us; for ultimately *all* scientific truth is only concerned with degrees of probability. It must, however, continue to suffer from the drawback that it is rooted rather in the exceptions than in the

routine of nature. It appeals essentially to a series of exceptional facts; and such a series, however prolonged, cannot form a firm basis for a general judgment about the world.

Some more general feature of the real, therefore, would seem to be needed, upon which to base our faith; and something of the sort may, perhaps, be found. At any rate, the implications of one general feature of human history which is often overlooked seem worth considering: we may call it *the precariousness of progress*. The more keenly we analyse the present posture of affairs, the more closely we scrutinize the course of history, the more we are impressed with the amazing ambiguity of the facts on which we base our guesses at the meaning of the real. The factors making for degeneration are always found to co-exist with those making for progress, and the facts nearly always permit themselves to be interpreted as incidents in either process. It is true at present, and seems to have been equally true at every other period of the world's history, that either of two diametrically opposite views may be taken of its prospects: it may be taken to be degenerating as easily as to be progressing. In fact, both views usually are taken, though not by the same persons. The young and hopeful believe in progress, the old and disenchanted look back upon the golden age, and complain that the country is going to the dogs. Moreover, logically there always *is* a case for the pessimist's as well as for the optimist's verdict on the value of existence and the trend of events, and the verdict of history is never an agreed one. Allowing for the psychological reinforcement which optimism gains from its superior survival-value, it will probably be fair to conclude that in logical strength the pessimist case and the optimist are fairly well matched.

It should be added, however, that these two alternatives require to be viewed in the light of the fact that hitherto the complete disaster, which has so often seemed imminent, and which the pessimists anticipate, has always been averted: history has never crushed the faith of the optimist, even though

it has never realized his dreams. Even though the human mode of progression has always resembled that of a blind man staggering along beside the brink of a precipice, progress has *usually* continued. This fact again looks curious; it has the providential aspect which we have repeatedly had occasion to notice, though we could not assign to it any definite value as a proof.

Secondly, the fact that progress always remains precarious and "contingent" and cannot be formulated as a law, may be found to have some interesting implications. It may mean that we are not *forced* into progress against our will, though we *can* progress *if we will*. In other words, to effect progress our assent is really needed. So, then, we are not the helpless victims of a destiny that drags us to a predestined end; we can actually, to some extent, steer our course and that of history. This is a possibility which should not only enhance our responsibilities, but also encourage us to play a part that seems no longer negligible. Once we realize that our own action is an essential factor in our future, we can proceed to devise means for grappling with the evils which beset human life. They are many and serious enough, and largely inherent in our nature. But our faith in evolution, meaning thereby the possibility of change, justifies the hope that neither our nature nor that of the universe is irrevocably fixed, and if it is possible to change it at all, it can be changed for the better. It is with this hope in our hearts that we should face the future and survey our present anxieties.

Let us start with the most obvious. It is pretty clear that if we allow our fighting instincts to get the better of our reason and to beguile us into more world-wars, it would not require more than two or three, or perhaps only one more, to see the end of civilization. It is also clear that the obstacles which bar the way to a policy of international appeasement are terribly strong in every country. Nationalistic sensitiveness is stronger, touchier, and more widespread than ever before. The spirit of mutual toleration of differences, the respect for the self-

determination of others, whether individuals or societies, the love of liberty, the faith in justice, and, even in many countries its administration, have not often been so weak.

Moreover, the very foundations of our social order are to-day called in question and attacked more resolutely and fiercely than ever before. There is widespread dissatisfaction both with capitalism, the economic basis of society, and with the family, its moral basis.

In the whole of Europe there seems to be only one sensible people, the Swiss; for among them alone is it not the delight of the majority to oppress their minorities: in the rest of Europe the ruling majorities all commit the atrocious absurdity of being at one and the same time imperialistic and nationalistic. That is, they are stupid enough not to see that these two ends are incompatible and incapable of realization in such a hodge-podge of nationalities and babel of languages as exist in that quarter of the globe. In consequence, the internal condition of most European countries is one of constant strain and latent civil war; moreover, with very little provocation class-wars might, it seems, break out as well. Yet these facts do not apparently avail to soften international animosities, but threaten rather to exacerbate them; while even if the habit of national wars could be dropped and class-wars avoided, their successors are already visible. Race-wars have not yet begun; but they are already looming on the horizon. So in spite of Leagues of Nations and Kellogg Pacts and treaties of non-aggression, the future of peace by no means looks assured.

Politically, it would seem, that the era of Democracy is ending. Despite the triumph of democratic politicians over the bureaucrats in the late war, democracies have shown themselves to be factious, prodigal, corrupt, easily deceived, and sadly inefficient; no wonder that in many parts of the world they are being superseded by various forms of dictatorship.

Moreover, the material basis for the supremacy of democracy, the military superiority of musket-bearing infantry over armored cavalry, which was established by the introduction of

fire-arms, has disappeared with the advent of the airplane. With its help, a small body of dare-devil airmen, starting from a secure base and supported by well-paid mechanics, can terrorize a whole country and render irresistible any rulers they choose to uphold. Thus from the merely military point of view the masses count no longer; gang-rule, and even tyranny, once more becomes a practical proposition.

If democracy goes, what will succeed it? It is fashionable and easy to answer: some form of government that will practice social planning instead of leaving men to find the ways to their ends by cut-throat competition. But it remains to be seen whether such gigantic plans as are needed are within the compass of any human mind; and if a planned economy collapses, what means of recovery from chaos will remain? Meanwhile, the attempts at planning already made suffice to show that *two* sorts of planning may be tried.

The first is exemplified by the Communist experiment now being enacted in Russia before the eyes of a puzzled world. It is hard to believe that it can succeed, even with a people so slavish and so credulous as the Russian. But supposing that it did succeed, it would entail two consequences. First, it would be fought with its own weapons. There would be counter-planning everywhere, aiming at different ends; and victory would attend the bigger brains. Secondly, if communism succeeded in Russia, there would be bred a type of man comparable with the social insects, with the ant-worker and the working bee, or at most, with the various castes of termites.

Now, this development must be pronounced not only conceivable, but possible; it would, however, put an end to any significant history of man. For, like the insect-states, human society would grow incapable of progress. This is the great defect which insect communisms suffer from; they have so suppressed the individual, and so subjected him to the purposes of the community, that he can no longer vary in any significant way. Now this is not only dull but destructive of the germs of progress; for the variations which initiate progress begin with

fit we are now fostering. Nor should we be satisfied with the *negative* eugenics that will arrest man's deterioration; we should endeavor to devise also a workable scheme of *positive* eugenics that will *improve* the race. If this can be done, the biological ascent of man, which has come to an end under present conditions, may be resumed. At present, biological progress has long been arrested, and the outlook is most menacing. Man has become a stationary or even a degenerating species, ever since civilization was invented. Until then, in savagery and barbarism, the conditions of life were sufficiently severe to produce an effective elimination of the unfit; after that, life was rendered easier, but no more intelligent method of selection was introduced to keep the race progressive. There is nothing in the known facts to support the belief that since the rise of civilization, say 6,000 years ago, there has been any improvement in the *intrinsic* qualities of the human race, and so in the *biological* basis of progress. What progress has been made has been due to tradition, to better methods of transmitting the accumulation of knowledge from generation to generation. But these methods can not be relied on indefinitely, if the intelligence to work them goes on declining.

Hence the future of the human race is by no means assured. Man is not bound either to progress, or even to survive, and what will happen to him depends largely on his own behavior. On the other hand, he *can* continue to progress, and that at a greatly accelerated pace and in directions in which he is not progressing at present, if he will. If the human race is willing to adopt a rational scheme of eugenical self-training and self-selection, it is hard to set any limits to the possibilities of its progress. It might become indefinitely more powerful, richer, healthier, stronger, more intelligent, and more beautiful; it might aspire to a life raised as far above that of the present day as the latter is superior to that of the lowest savage.

As improvements that may reasonably be anticipated, if man is willing to aim at them, we may enumerate; the extirpation of all noxious animals, of vermin like the rat and the

individuals, and by suppressing individuality these germs are killed.

There is, however, conceivable a second and more intelligent mode of planning, of which Italian Fascism may be the harbinger. It does not fly in the face of natural selection, and try to reduce all to the same lowly level: it is selective, that is, aristocratic, in method, and aims at raising man *above* his present level. Thus it is essentially an attempt by human society to direct its own development, to supersede mere survival-values by ethical values of equal or greater survival-value and substituting for natural selection a selection of what is judged to be the *best* to grow a *super-man*.

In the execution of this program it would first of all be necessary to arrest the contra-selection at present going on in the whole civilized world, in consequence of which all societies recruit themselves, by an undesigned preference, from those whom they (and every one else) would judge to be the unfit, because under social conditions weaklings and undesirables are actually enabled, not only to survive, but also to survive more copiously than the more valuable elements in the population.

This comes about by a social oversight. As the undesirables have a higher birth-rate and their children are cared for by others more competent than their incompetent parents, there is produced a selection of the worst, and an alarming proliferation of the insane and feeble-minded. The costs of this suicidal policy are borne by the competent and intelligent, and prompt them to limit further their output of valuable citizens. The deterioration of the race produced by this insane ordering of society pronounces the doom of civilization in no very distant future. For pretty soon its morons and lunatics will not be able to assimilate its intellectual, nor to operate its technical, achievements any longer. The apparatus on which our progress should rest will be perverted into an engine of destruction. In short, one of the most urgent social needs at present is a study of the science of eugenics, and the application of its findings to human life, in order to put an end to the survival of the un-

mouse, and especially of the little demons of Ahriman's creation, the noxious insects, the practical conquest of all diseases, and, in consequence, a great extension of human life. A conquest of death it might be rash to promise, although it has already come to seem a mystery why any one should die. Why should the individual die, when the race is deathless? Is not he also a self-repairing machine—and once he has learnt *that* magic art, of which *our* machines remain incapable, why should not his body continue to repair itself for ever, and even grow more and more expert in so doing? Why should it relax its efforts to keep alive after a while, and allow itself to get clogged up more and more with the waste products of its own working until it ceases to function altogether, and dies a "natural" death? The whole process is quite contrary to the analogy of the learning process elsewhere; for what we have learnt we can do better and better with practice, not worse and worse. Or can senescence be paralleled by the growth of bad habits and of sloth, which shows itself in a decline from a skill formerly possessed? Certainly it is odd that the capacity for self-repair diminishes with age not only in the individual life but also in the ascent of life to "higher" forms: until this tendency can be reversed, it will frustrate the desire to go on living, and it seems vain to hope that natural death can be averted.

On the other hand, as knowledge grows and it is more widely recognized that the true knowledge is the knowledge which is power, man's conquest of material nature should continue, and become more complete. This should engender works of engineering far more stupendous than anything achieved as yet. It is not fantastic to suppose that the artificial control of temperature will become so perfect that it will render the whole earth habitable from the deserts to the poles. And the next hundred years may see the Mississippi tamed by the transmission of its devastating floods to California to turn her remaining deserts into fertile fields.

The curse of Adam, toil, may be lifted from the back of

man by the development of the machine. We may look forward to such a multiplication of machinery that a few hours a day of machine-tending will suffice to assure to everyone an ample living. For the tediousness and strain of our present work are largely due to the mere length of our working day, and most of our economic difficulties are due to the mal-distribution of the leisure which results from the use of the machine. Both the idle rich and the idle poor are essentially social problems due to this mal-distribution. But if by some stroke of social reorganization every one could be induced to shoulder some portion of the burden and to do a little work, a great deal of our "work" would turn into "play" and would cease to be irksome. For example, rat-hunting and fishing would be "sport," and gardening a "hobby," if they were not all-day occupations; while, conversely, it is already recognized that any game or sport, when pursued by whole-time professionals, becomes their "work."

The abolition of "work," however, would be a blessing only on condition that our present mal-distribution of employment and leisure were remedied, so that all would have enough of them, and none too much. At present our population is divisible into the idle rich, the idle poor, and the workers. Of these the workers suffer from excess of work, the others from defect. Yet a better distribution of the same amount of work might increase alike the worth and the happiness of all classes.

Only, however, if all had learnt what at present they are hardly taught, namely, the proper use of leisure. Instruction in this subtle art should be regarded as an essential branch in a proper system of social education. In particular, it should be regarded as the real aim of a liberal education. Educationists would thereby be enabled to draw a clear and unmistakable line between vocational training or education for work, and liberal education or education for leisure. And as the world grew richer and the total amount of leisure to be distributed ampler, the importance of liberal education would steadily increase. We should not, therefore, despair of our universities!

But when all has been said that the most sanguine foresight can conceive, when all has been done that our utmost efforts can achieve, a feeling of doubt remains. Shall we ever be able to accept our present world as containing the capacity for the full satisfaction of our demands upon existence, for the full realization of the aspirations of the human soul? Shall we ever be able to fashion a heaven upon earth? It seems very dubious whether we shall ever be able to do this, whether we ought to do this, and whether we are *intended* to do this. In the first place, terrestrial existence on a tiny planet of a star, long past its prime and lost in the immensities of space, can never be made to seem sufficiently significant and satisfactory to be acceptable as the whole meaning of life. So why should we resent it that the signs are multiplying that our physical life and, indeed, our whole physical universe may be but a temporary, transient episode in the scheme of being? We have no abiding habitation on the earth, nor has the earth an assured position in the stellar universe, nor is the physical universe itself eternal and constructed to endure. It seems to have had an origin in a not incalculably distant past; it seems doomed to fade and pass away in a not incalculably distant future; it is stamped throughout with the marks and signals of impermanence. So I am not disposed to withdraw the judgment I pronounced more than forty years ago when I declared Time to be the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect.* The physical universe is, and seems destined to remain, a disappointment.

Can we escape from it? Can we emancipate ourselves from the oppressive spell it casts even upon our thought? Can we raise the Veil of Maya? With the aid of Philosophy, perhaps. For to philosophy the point of view of science is not final, and it has the right to insist that all known *data* have to be included in the final synthesis.

We should do well, therefore, to remind ourselves how very artificial and selective a creation of our science the physical

**Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 257.

universe really is. It by no means satisfies the demands of a philosophic synthesis. It by no means uses up all the material provided by our immediate experience. For do we not all live in worlds upon worlds of dream, imagination, and aspiration, which supplement, transmute, and transcend the physical universe? True, we mostly look upon, and down upon, these worlds as "subjective": but this should not be taken as denying that they are real. It means merely that they are not at present of great pragmatic value, that they do not enter into the great practical synthesis called common-sense reality, that they do not serve as a basis for inter-subjective intercourse and common action. But this does not entitle us to deny them psychical reality, any more than a dogmatic monism has a right to deny them metaphysical reality. Hence a philosophy which reckons seriously with the metaphysical possibility of pluralism and with the psychological ultimacy of personal experience will think twice before it assumes, without further ado, that the present universe of physics is all the being there is, and that the human soul is inextricably entangled in it and cannot conceivably rise above it. But at this point may we not finally remind ourselves that all the major religions have always offered us the assurance that our present world of shows and shadows is not the only nor the true reality, and hinted to us the transcendent glories of their heavens and the terrors of their hells?

The argument has led us to the threshold of religion, where we must arrest it; but philosophically there is nothing to hinder us from recognizing an indefinite plurality of worlds, with a series of transitions into worlds of higher reality and greater value, which would be heavens, or of nightmare lapses into illusion and unreality, which would be hells. And of both heavens and hells would hold the law, which was enunciated at the outset, and several times repeated, namely, that everything will be what it turns out to be in virtue of what it has been through!

CURRENT THOUGHT

Logical and Non-Logical Experience

To one who follows the journals of philosophical discussion it appears increasingly clear that the old battle lines of philosophy are fading away with the advent of new weapons and new methods of approach. Realists and idealists have difficulty in distinguishing one another, and the variety of pragmatism has become a rival to the variety of religious experience.

Perhaps the sharpest and deepest difference between contemporary philosophies relates not to their views as to what the stuff of reality may be, but to the kind of relationship which they conceive to exist between the logical and the non-logical aspects of experience. If we consider three philosophers so divergent as Croce, the Idealist, Wittgenstein, the Logical Positivist, and C. I. Lewis the Conceptual Pragmatist, we find that they have in common a radical distinction between the logical and the non-logical together with an inability to state the meaning of their relationship to one another. For Croce aesthetic experience, which includes all sense-experience and feeling, is completely unconcerned with matters of truth and reality. For him the poet and the philosopher are at opposite poles of experience both in their interest and in their methodology. For Wittgenstein a similar dichotomy of the world exists, though in application of his theory he would consign Croce's philosophy, and his own as well, to the non-logical side of experience on the grounds that seen properly they are unspeakable nonsense, adding that 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.' In the class of the logical he would only include those relations which he believed positively to apply to anything which happened to be the case. For C. I. Lewis, though he is willing to grant that there is a relation between 'presentational immediacy' and our conceptual systems, this relationship cannot be logically stated because of what he believes to be the essential difference of the terms. In a recent discussion Einstein similarly drew attention to the fact that a scientific theory as a logical system is self-contained, and that its relation to 'experience' can only be intuitively realized or pointed to, not logically stated. Altogether, there appears to be a tendency among the most varied philosophies both to sharply differentiate between logical and non-logical experience, and to confess their inability to state the nature of their relationship to one another.

Perhaps it is this impasse which has sent philosophy today into such corners as that of symbolic logic where it chews over the picked bones which science tosses to it. Be that as it may, there is at least one philosopher who has attempted to comprehend the meaning of the relationship between logical and non-logical experience, namely Henri Bergson. Like James, Bergson believed that philosophy was

more than dialectic, more than science,—hence his belief in ‘intuition’ as the method of philosophy. For Croce, as for most philosophers, intuition meant the unspeakable and non-significant. Hence Bergson appeared fundamentally to be, as he actually frequently was, falling back into the mystical and poetic and confusing it with philosophy. There was, however, a method in his confusion, for Bergson understood ‘intuition’ as the kind of experience which gathered into one synthesis both the logic and the content of the situation, together with their meanings and implications. If life were not confused, if our deepest truths—and ultimately our logical truths—were not unspeakable, Bergson could rightly be condemned as a romantic. But Bergson, like Plato, was not afraid of carrying philosophy even beyond his own powers of analysis, and like Dante he saw that when philosophy is taken seriously as an attempt to grasp experience comprehensively it must move and finally lose itself in poetry. Plato wrote in myths because he believed in their philosophical significance; Dante was able to see ‘the scattered leaves of all the universe’ ‘bound by love in one volume’ because he believed that his poetic intuition gave just as true insight into the nature of the world as the logical insights of scientific theory.

Bergson may not be consistent, and it is well to discover his inconsistencies; he may not have erected an indestructible system or founded a school; but he put life and growth into philosophy, and he deeply informed the philosophical thinking of our century. A philosopher can do no more.

H. Jeffery Smith.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

To Heal the Times

Dr. Burdette B. Brown Writes to the Editor:

I do not have much skill as a writer, and I am not particularly good according to many peoples’ standards, nor do I lay any claim to being a saint. But the desire to do good and to be a useful citizen has been a potent influence in my life, particularly to clarify the way for people to go and to lend a friendly hand. For example I believe in disarmament, for competition and jealousy too easily become unreasonable, though figuratively I should be willing for nations to have a few switches and bats to use in a pinch, and to know how to box.

This influence began towards the end of my senior year and it pretty well determined my decisions for several years. After a limited experience as a teacher, and after a term in the church, I became more dissatisfied than ever with the temper and trend of things. Believing that an effective way to reach people was through the education of the child population, I began to study schools of every type, at first statistically in order to grasp the problems comprehensively. Along with others I worked first with the weaker groups,—

the neglected and the handicapped, then for students of primary and junior schools, and finally with those in the colleges. Methods varied, and local conditions naturally were important, but almost everywhere the results were gratifying.

But this kind of program has not saved our country from its present dilemma—surplus and deficit in the same town, riches and poverty, surfeit, waste, hunger. Economically the situation is bad. Expenses frequently exceed income, and a huge debit has continued to pile up. Banditry has tended to undermine confidence, but even worse has been the sharp practice used by clever crooks to exploit those whose well-being was entrusted to their care. Men who have been relied upon to maintain public safety have looked to their own interest and feathered their own nest.

Having said this in order to make known my background and position, I wish, in all seriousness, to make the following observations, and to invite the readers to their immediate consideration for appropriate action. First, however, I would add that my conception of a modern school of philosophers is that of a group who reflect on just such problems with reference to age-long and enduring principles, and that though the opinions of such a group may not refer to immediate expediency, the world and in particular our country would have been saved some trouble if it had listened to them in the past.

The argument I wish to make is this: The country will not recover a normal poise until a few simple things are accomplished. It is useless to delude ourselves by thinking any measure or collection of measures to offer a panacea, but one first requirement that cannot be too strongly emphasized is that *there has to be a change of heart among our people*. Evils now present in individual lives will fade away only through the rise of *an interest and purpose resting on a plane of good will towards others*. There must grow up the kind of solicitude and feeling of responsibility that one normally has towards one's own family.

Three important factors in our present trouble I find to be, the moving picture, the radio, and the newspaper, as managed at the present time. Of course, I do not object to them in their entirety, but only to those factors harmful to society, into the particulars of which I probably need not go. They have been widely discussed and are well known, yet these evils continue. Why? Because money rolls over the counters to the treasuries to pay countless expenses and possibly some dividends.

Will these agencies continue to fool the people in order to get their money? Or will they have backbone enough to stand for right and not sell counterfeit products to those who trust them? The burden of proof rests on them. I hope they will take their share of responsibility and sell only what women and men, girls and boys, families

of pure minded, quiet, law-abiding citizens should have in order to live peaceful, comfortable, reasonable lives in their homes and communities.

BURDETTE B. BROWN.

Largo

The acacias in my yard are a blaze of golden glory, and the Japanese jasmine that climbs my wall as high as the roof is sending forth its delicate blossoms. Already the leaves on my California sycamore have attained the size of the traditional "rabbit's ears," which in more inclement climes would mean that it were high time that I sought the open with rod and fly.

Here nature comes to quick and early maturity. By the time the laws permit me to go forth the turbulence of the San Gabriel will have subsided and the roar of its rushing waters will have quieted to a more contained and inward peace. There will be no sudden disappointment of glorious May day overtaken with a belated snow-storm such as I have often met on my beloved New England waters. There all comes to swift culmination and brief endurance, but here the summer is prolonged.

However, by late June the emerald of our hills will have changed to golds or velvet browns, and while New England revels in the lushness of rich greens we shall take on the somberness of the sere and yellow leaf. By July my roaring river will have become a babbling brook, and my Water Ousel—he is god's and mine—will wade or swim the little pools industriously clearing the helgrams from the rocks, filling the canyon shadows with a swift activity, and the forest stillness with a song sweeter than the Nightingale's. About this prolongation of seasons there is no demand for the haste that characterizes the northern climes. There is opportunity to emphasize the sustained note. The full orchestra of summer arrives early, but it stays late. There is time, time to rest, time to think, as my brook mingles its lullaby with the tinkle of burro bells coming down the pass. There is every excuse for living the larger life. But alas, we must show the world we are no whit less fools than the worst. We squander the priceless patrimonies of nature on the insignificant and the unreal. For the full-tide of nature calls for a full-tide in the human soul, and they are wise who keep themselves in tune with her. If the collapse of modern civilization shall teach us the value of reflection, the peace of adaptation to circumstance: if it shall make us aware of the compensations of mountain and stream and countryside and home and children and the imperishable joys to which our fast running life has made us oblivious, then whatever outward riches may have been taken from us we shall have achieved the true riches—and, without money and without price, shall be prepared to enter upon the full-tide of life.

R.T.F.

Along the Bookshelf

The Culmination of L'Évolution Créatrice

LES DEUX SOURCES DE LA MORALE ET DE LA RELIGION,

par HENRI BERGSON. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris. 1932. Pp. 346.

Professor Bergson's early work was written largely for the purpose of calling the attention of a smug and satisfied world to the deadlock that had arisen in the problem of knowledge through the sole dependence upon analysis. In his earlier work he set before us how through the sole use of the mathematical method science had achieved a static world with no power left in it to explain that which was living. Thus, as we pressed back the boundaries of ignorance and attempted to know more and more of our world, we were really knowing less and less, because we were getting away from that reality which was life and which could be known primarily through the intuitions. In *The Creative Evolution* he showed how the progress of evolution had been along two very distinct lines: in the insect world along the lines of a pure, or nearly pure, dependence upon instinct, which puts the insect immediately *en rapport* with its surroundings; while man has secured his advances mainly by the use of brain and reason—since he is never entirely without the instinctive make-up. The use of reason, however, implies analysis, and has been the source of the mathematical methods that have come to be the sole dependence of scientific thought. It is in no spirit of abrogating scientific thought, however, that Bergson writes. It is to call attention to the complementary factor of intuition without which knowledge can never be complete, and without which it can never grasp the fundamental realities.

The same difficulty holds in the field of science and in the field of religion, where the rationalizing element has built up an intricate system of theological dogma which has (in most cases) no bearing whatever upon the religious life—that is, the life of ethical achievement. There has grown up again and again in the history of religious thought dogma which has found itself at war with things as they are and inconsistent with the living needs of man. It has remained for the few mystics who had light regard for theology and demanded experience of God to lift theology out of the ditch into which it had fallen and make of it once more a going concern.

The development of the theological type of religion is discussed in one large section of the book on *Static Religion*, wherein the author sets forth the scientific attack upon the history of comparative religions. It certainly is true that a great deal has been written about the primitive soul which had no connection with the actual facts.

The process has been to take the most ignorant men, representing the lowest forms of culture, to study their superstitions, and to call the basis of these the most primitive; then by process of analysis to show how the more ethical religions have grown out of these base primitive instincts by a process of combination and elimination. In this way it was presumed that one had learned all there was to be scientifically known about the primitive soul. Bergson points out that in the process the "primitive soul" has entirely escaped, since what we call such has as ancient an heredity as the modern soul or the highest type of soul. The reviewer feels very certain that the day must shortly arrive when a great portion of what has passed as the scientific history of comparative religion must be thrown to the discard because of its dependence upon a dogmatic theory in the pursuit of which it has been led far away from the facts of life.

Bergson holds that if there has been any profound modification of man through civilization it has resulted from an accumulation in the social milieu, as in a reservoir, of habits and understandings into which each generation has directed the individual. Thus have grown up institutions, churches, societies, and theologies, which have largely created both the social and religious outlook of the individual. To trace these developments one needs to know the history of the time rather than the principle of evolution which lies within religion itself. To reach the very essence of religion and to understand the religious history of man we must pass from a static to a dynamic religion. And here we find the difference between static religion, characterized by stereotyped forms, postulations, incantations, and the dynamic religion of life. Bergson illustrates this by a reference to prayer. In the religion which he calls dynamic the one who prays is indifferent toward the form of verbal expression. It is an elevation of the soul. In static religion, on the contrary, the efficacy of the prayer depends very largely upon the words which are uttered, and frequently requires the intervention of a priest and attending ritual. This has always been particularly true of polytheism, in which prayer assumes a stereotyped form with an arrest of thought not only with respect to the significance of the language used but of the very succession of the words, with certain concomitant gestures to make it efficacious. It is an attempt by the exercise of the intelligence to react defensively against the forces of nature which have power to harm the individual and to destroy society.

Bergson identifies dynamic religion with the Christian mystic experience—Christian as distinguished from other and pagan mysticisms. The mystic comes into direct contact with the *élan vital*, which is the source of his religion and inspiration. If one would know and understand the meaning of God, he should then not attack some formal notion or definition of God but should himself resort to the mystic experience, for it is only in experience that he can come into communication with these deeper sources of life. Herein lie the

inspirations not only for religion but for music and art which give that something more than intelligence or understanding which is necessary for creativeness.

Personalists will hail this marked advance in Professor Bergson's thinking as definitely aligning him with the personalistic position, and to them *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion* will seem to bring the culmination of his thought. R.T.F.

The Quest of Personality

HABITS, THEIR MAKING AND UNMAKING, by KNIGHT DUNLAP. Liveright, Inc., New York. 1932. Pp. x, 326. \$3.00.

PERSONALITY, AND THE DIVERS METHODS BY WHICH SOME MEN, AND HERE AND THERE A WOMAN, HAVE ACHIEVED IT, by MARJORIE BARSTOW GREENBIE. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xv, 328. \$2.25.

THE ART OF FEELING, A PSYCHOLOGY OF OUR HUMAN ADVENTURE, by HORACE G. WYATT. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York. 1932. Pp. x, 293. \$2.50.

Dr. Knight Dunlap's *Habits* is the result of many years of experimenting with old and new principles of habit formation and the general psychology of learning. Those who desire to learn the latest conclusions of psychology with regard to the principles, the theories, the process, the conditions of learning, will be able to find them most ably discussed here. There are chapters on retaining, recalling, and relearning; on remembering and forgetting; on personal and social adjustment; and on the breaking of bad habits. The general scheme follows that of modern psychology, which assumes that the best way to break a habit is to practice it under disgusting conditions. One will scarcely presume to quarrel with this standpoint, but may be pardoned, possibly, if he has a mind to the very strict limits of the method and the necessity of practicing it under the sternest conditions of oversight. The author, of course, calls attention to this fact himself. One of the greatest dangers of practical psychology at the present time lies in its easy misuse by designing people who make it the means of exploitation for personal profit. The book will be, therefore, we believe, of far more value in the hands of professional psychologists than in those of the layman.

Marjorie Barstow Greenbie's *Personality* is what some would describe as particularly "racy," as the personality which she conceives is largely one of the "go-getter" who is successful in acquiring fame or money or love. The style is at times florid, and the discussion ranges all the way from free-beer to free-love. We can not but feel that her definition of personality is somewhat limited, as it appears to her to be nothing more nor less than a surplus of vitality.

It is vitality over and above what is necessary to keep the individual functioning easily up to the level of his group (p. 9). Thus she grants personality equally to great saints and to great

sinner. Since we believe personality has to do with the perfection of character, we can not believe that the individualist who merely manages to run amuck in society or to enforce his selfish will on others has achieved the heights of personality. That is merely a development of the individual. The author, although she admits that it is now the fashion to revile Puritanism, and that it had a certain stern power of creating men, seems to discover that it is mostly to be blamed for the ills that now afflict society. Along with her condemnation of Puritanism she discovers in the wholeness and roundness of the medieval ideals the desired goal of modern society. She seems to think that it is quite an up to date view of evolution to assume that it is the result of influences on animal life of things external to the organism—whereas quite the opposite is true. She speaks of the old university and convent life of the twelfth century in apparent ignorance that the university life of the twelfth century was not yet old, and, in fact, had not yet begun, since the first real university organization took place not earlier than the end of the twelfth century, and the University of Paris, the mother of the others, dates its founding from 1201.

Her study of personality follows very largely the great lovers of history, as she seems to consider that personality and sexuality are somewhat synonymous. In spite of what we consider her somewhat perverted view of personality, there are occasional counsels of wisdom which it would be well to remember. But while the book is very readable, it seems to us to contain too much looseness of statement and of thought to give it scientific value.

In striking contrast with these is *The Art of Feeling*, by Horace G. Wyatt. We do not remember in ten years running across so sane a work on the practical problems of personal psychology. The book deals primarily with the emotional life of the individual. There are chapters on *Imagery and Emotion*, on *Understanding Others*, on the relation of emotion to thinking, and to habit. One section deals with *Emotion and Character*, and lays down rules for emotional control. Another section, headed *Our Emotional Future*, deals with the education of emotions. The book is, we feel, particularly valuable because of the oversight by which the present age has lost for itself the place of emotion in practical living. It has long been the fashion to deride the emotions and to forget that emotion is at the heart of all great and ameliorative movements for humanity. Until modern civilization shall have learned the secret of the control and education of the emotions we can scarcely hope for that rejuvenation of society for which we all pray. The author calls our attention to the fact that the great thinkers, the creative minds of history, have always been the great enthusiasts, people who either were naturally impassioned or could summon emotion to their aid. While emotion may cause a perversion of thought, it is emotion, also, that keeps it straight:

It may prevent as well as promote crooked thinking. This hap-

pens where the desired and the desirable ends concur. For then we are not tempted to sow lies in our souls. Perfect love, it is said, casts out fear. The fear it dispels is usually the fear of others' or of one's own condemnation; it is our envy, hatred, malice, and uncharitableness to others that we fear to expose, and study to disguise. But the great altruistic emotions make for straight thinking. (p. 67) . . .

Fresh ideas jump into consciousness that will support our case, once we have achieved emotional absorption in the matter in hand. (p. 70)

Of course the author is alive to the place of emotion in religion and in art, and reminds us at this point of the very advanced positions taken by Professor Bergson in his recent book, "Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion." He holds that the experiences of the religious mystic are ineffable—that they break through language and escape the common mind because they are individual achievements. The efficacy of sincere art lies also in the artist's emotions:

For the less gifted amongst us, the secret of artistic attainment lies also in sincerity, in discovering our deeper selves, in not affecting appreciations (that is, emotions) we do not feel, or habituating ourselves to mock experiences. (pp. 115, 116) . . . Only dull humans and dismal psychologists are always busy, in the name of knowledge itself, reducing to dust and ashes the unquenchable flames of human aspiration. (p. 119)

Of particular value is the chapter on *Controlling One's Emotions*. This control seems to him quite possible, in the face of the determinists who

appear to forget their doctrine when they treat the psychology of conduct, and assume the truth of that very freedom of choice which they have denied, while a few preserve an apparent consistency by verbal subterfuge. (p. 133)

When it comes to the matter of integration we find him setting forth a theory quite in contradiction to that of Professor Dunlap and, to our way of thinking, much more valuable. In the chapter on *Control through Character* he defines the method by which the personality may secure its own integration, and incidentally offers the best refutation of Mrs. Greenbie's concept of personality:

There is, however, more than one way of seeking integration. Anyone can purchase integration of a kind—by letting one powerful inclination run amuck, say, desire for sensual satisfaction, for social recognition, or for money. But he is likely to find himself curiously defeating his purpose. For just so far as he retains intelligence and will, and all self-conscious living is thinking and willing in degree, that disconcerting 'ought' feeling is apt to intervene, and by enthroning his inclination he is only widening the breach between the imperious and the imperative. The true way to attain what integration we may is not to seek

to be integrated, not to make one's own integration an object at all. What distinguishes the man of character is not that he is integrated, but that he integrates. His own integration is never complete. One integration opens the way to another; and in this unceasing quest he finds his happiness. (pp. 161, 162)

Thus, the happiness at which we arrive through our own secure unity derives not from circumstance, and not from a prudent use of circumstance, but from ourselves pursuing our highest values. It is the kind of happiness we are thinking of when we claim that virtue is its own reward, and the kind that those are not thinking of who deride that maxim. It is the peculiar emotional satisfaction derived from seeking final values—ends we feel to be more worth while than the temporary happiness of the other level. (p. 163)

This happiness

is compatible with physical pain and discomfort, and all sorts of mental distress, but it is the feeling behind and beyond all these that the pursuit of what seems most valuable proves and will prove its claim. A feeling of ultimate security and serenity, not of body, but of what is most truly oneself. (p. 164)

There is a strong temptation to quote great sections of this very valuable book, but we must confine ourselves to but one phase of it, the chapter on *The Emotion of Self-Respect*. It was many years ago that Robert Louis Stevenson, in the famous "Christmas Sermon," admonished us "to have a few friends, and these without capitulation, and above all, upon the same stern condition, to keep friends with oneself." The psychological basis of this most valuable advice is here shown by Professor Wyatt. In his distinction between social shame and moral shame,

To preserve one's good name with one's fellows is a potent motive. But whereas social shame is shallow and outer, moral shame is deep and utter, the only shame that goes to the root of us, because it is rooted not in society but in ourselves . . . Only as we come to recognize the essential nature of self-respect do we also distinguish clearly the two kinds of happiness that we seek, and the true relation of character to what is known as the integrated personality. (p. 179) . . . The serenity of character is the abiding sense of security, of having secured what really matters most, and holding it fast . . . it means the presence of perpetual peace, peace of mind beyond the storm and stress, the turmoil and distress, of our ordinary emotional life. (p. 180) . . . The joy of ideal endeavor transcends the pleasures of sense; the peace that passeth understanding passes it just because it cannot be interpreted into the familiar feelings of bodily comfort or the satisfaction of natural desire . . . There could be no more fruitful or significant research for modern psychology, if it were practicable, than into the emotional achievements of which, by

virtue of will and intelligence, man has become capable. (p. 181)

It is impossible to praise too highly for its practical value, and particularly to the formative years of youth, this really great book. We congratulate the author on his achievement, and Houghton Mifflin Company on their judgment in producing a work so valuable.

R. T. F.

The Second Peirce Volume

COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,
edited by CHARLES HARTSHORNE and PAUL WEISS. Vol. II.
Elements of Logic. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1932.
Pp. xii, 535. \$6.00.

This volume is composed of reprints of Peirce's numerous contributions to Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, of some of his early Papers (1878) in the *Popular Science Monthly* (the more important ones being reserved for Vol. V), of his Paper in the Johns Hopkins *Studies in Logic* (1883), together with a number of essays on logical topics which Peirce began at various periods of his life but never completed. His own opinion of them, which his editors courageously print, was that "no human being could ever put together the fragments," and it is no disparagement of their self-sacrificing labors to say that they have not been able to accomplish the miracle of restoring its ideal rotundity to Humpty Dumpty's form. However, as the great Harvard hoard of Peirce's manuscripts has long been represented in several quarters as a sort of philosophic Joanna Southcott's Box, each successive volume, as it appears, will no doubt be eagerly scanned for inspiration and novelties of thought, worthy of the eponym and mystery man of modern pragmatism. It is to be feared that, so far as this volume goes, such hopes will be largely disappointed. For on the whole Peirce belonged to the school of logicians who attach importance to the archaeology of their subject, and think that a science already overburdened with an untamed multitude of technical terms can be enriched by multiplying their number and changing their formulation.

Of the wider philosophic bearings of logic there is hardly any recognition. The psychological applications of logic are simply waved aside (pp. 260, 25-6, etc.). No repugnance is shown towards the traditional conception of logic as a formal analysis of "propositions," though its inherent verbalism is made clearer than usual. Compulsion is welcomed as the only force that can impel the human mind to the pursuit of truth (p. 191). There is little trace of pragmatism or its influence. For the caption in Book II, chapter 4, § 4, "a pragmatic interpretation of the logical subject," merely substitutes for a verbal definition of lithium directions for obtaining it, and the dictum (p. 387) that "the utility and value of the distinction are to be tested by their applications" seems to be not doctrine but merely an ebullition of natural pragmatism. On the other hand it is something

of a shock to a critical logician to read that "the meaning of the formula of identity presents only one small difficulty" (p. 357), and to be told (p. 201) that "a self-contradictory proposition is not meaningless; it means too much." The repeated refusal (pp. 187, 201) to recognize the possibility of the meaningless as an alternative to the true and false, and its classification as *truth*, confirm the worst suspicions about formal logic, and support the accusation that its 'truth' rests essentially on an abstraction from meaning. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that one can always cull from Peirce an anthology of brilliant, pungent, and incisive dicta. I would recommend particularly the remarks on bias (p. 380) as the best (and almost the only) defence of "disinterested" inquiry I have met. It recognizes also that "our atrocious legal procedure" takes a different way to truth, and prefers "hot and partisan debate." That, too, would seem to be the verdict of scientific history.

F. C. S. Schiller.

Plato and Aristotle

PLATO AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES, A STUDY IN FOURTH-CENTURY LIFE AND THOUGHT, by G. C. FIELD. E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., New York. Pp. xi, 242. \$4.00.

One who takes up Professor Field's *Plato and his Contemporaries* is quite likely to ask why there should be another book on Plato, since the ground has been so exhaustively traversed that there would seem to be nothing that scholarship can now add to knowledge. Nevertheless this work was quite well worth doing, since the author sets forth the political and social circumstances that attended the Platonic writings, and succeeds in treating the whole matter of Plato and his contemporaries with a cheering freshness. Not only so but his particular approach to the subject brings out not a few aspects of Plato that tend to be quite forgotten or misinterpreted by the ordinary "dry-as-dust" commentary. The book is especially to be commended to young readers seeking an introduction to the life and works of Plato. The discussion of the chronological order of the Dialogues has particular interest and seems reasonable in the theories advanced.

R. T. F.

ARISTOTLE, by G. R. G. MURE. Oxford University Press, New York. 1932. Pp. xi, 282. \$2.75.

It is more than probable that the fame of Aristotle rests essentially on the two (not unconnected) facts that he displays the professorial mentality at its highest and best, and that his picture of the Sage at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* exactly expresses the view which every truly academic man would like the world to take of his nature and function. So all truly professorial spirits conspire to keep his philosophy alive. If, however, the study of Aristotle *should* perish with that of ancient Greek, it will not be the fault of the

University of Oxford. Not only has it in recent years issued a complete translation of the Aristotelian Corpus, and produced editions of several of his chief treatises, but also Dr. W. D. Ross's scholarly account of the whole system, and now this book of Mr. Mure's, which seems likely to be a formidable competitor with Dr. Ross's. Mr. Mure's book is not on a large scale, but its scope is ambitious. It is not merely a technical account of Aristotelian philosophy, but aims at placing Aristotle in his historical context. So he starts his Part I with a chapter From Thales to Socrates, and two chapters on the problem of Platonism, and adds to the seven chapters on Aristotle in Part II a chapter on the History and Influence of Aristotelianism and another on Modern Aristotelian Studies, which is mainly a useful discussion of Professor Jaeger's attempts to trace Aristotle's spiritual development from Platonism to positivism. With so much ground to cover, Mr. Mure must needs compress, and does so skilfully; but his conciseness often rivals that of Aristotle himself, and makes his book by no means easy reading. He must also *select*, and naturally selects the problems of Aristotelianism which interest him most. These are metaphysical, and as he is an idealistic monist, much concerned about the relations of particulars, individuals, and universals, Aristotle's pluralism sticks in his gizzard, and Aristotle's conception of substance is the all-pervasive crux (cp. p. 182f.). He has not got over this crux with complete success; but then who has? No philosophic system is ever completely consistent; and the more far-reaching are its discrepancies, the more thought it stimulates in those who try to think it out. And Aristotle's fame, at any rate, rests on much besides his doctrine of first and second *ousia*. Mr. Mure translates this cardinal word 'substance,' instead of 'being,' or 'essence,' and this would be, of course, defensible enough if he indicated also when 'substance' stands for *hypokeimenon*. Mr. Mure's account of Aristotle's indeterminism is also puzzling. Being evidently a determinist himself he does not like it, and cannot explain it; he concludes (p. 149) "on the whole, then, Aristotle is neither a determinist nor a libertarian." This is rather reminiscent of the politician who declared he would avoid both partiality and impartiality! I have noticed a number of misprints, the most serious of which are the omission of a subscript *i* in *energeia* (p. 10) the *vox nihili*, *pasis* for *phasis* (p. 213*n*), *Eluchis* for *Elenchis* (p. 216*n*), 'last-known' for 'last known' (p. 234), and 'Strabo' for 'Strato' (p. 233).

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE. An Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Public Speaking. By LANE COOPER. D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1932. Pp. xlviii, 259.

The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle is usually classed among his earliest works, though in its present form it must be subsequent to his discovery of the syllogism. By writing it he performed a signal service

to the Platonic School, to which presumably he still belonged: he taught its novices what they wanted to know, rather than what interested their professors. For the young men of the period attended the schools of the philosophers for the same utilitarian reason as they had flocked to the Sophists in the fifth century B. C., and frequented the rhetors in the fourth. They wanted to learn the essential art of public speaking, which was still a *sine qua non* of a political career, or even vitally necessary. The *Rhetoric* appears to have been a huge success and to have taken most of the wind out of the rhetors' sails, if not out of their speeches. And in spite of the fact that it could give no instruction in the form of oratory most necessary to salvation, the art of *preaching*, its vogue has continued almost into our day. It ceased to be a prescribed text in the university of Oxford only in the life-time of men still living.

Hence it is not altogether surprising that Professor Cooper should be persuaded that "Aristotle's treatise on Rhetoric is one of the best and wisest books" (p. vii), that rare bird "a practical psychology and the most helpful book extant for writers of prose and for speakers of every sort" (p. xvii). As in the parallel case of the present value of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a textbook of ethics, this estimate is double-edged, and throws a curious light on the progressiveness of the teaching of rhetoric. It looks as though rhetoric, like virtue, were as difficult to teach as ever. However, it cannot be denied that Professor Cooper's work is a praiseworthy and laborious attempt to dilute the condensation of Aristotle's thought and the terseness of his style sufficiently for the purposes of the department of oratory of a modern American university. In so doing he naturally has to modernize—sometimes to excess—and sometimes to neglect unduly the philosophic background of Aristotle's terminology. Thus to translate "exo tou pragmatos" by "irrelevant," instead of "beside the point," is to blur the important difference between ancient objectivism and modern subjectivism. Again, to speak (p. 3) of "non-artistic proofs, such as laws, witnesses, compacts, tortures, and oaths," will sound queer to a reader who is not warned that *non-artistic* is a translation of 'atechnos,' and who is not instructed in the technical meaning which "techne" bears in Aristotelian philosophy. It should have been made clear that Aristotle meant, not to recommend "artistic" modes of torture, but only that "laws, witnesses, compacts, tortures, oaths" supplied the orator with *data* for his eloquence to work upon and to show his skill. F.C.S.S.

In the Middle Ages

MEDIEVAL FAITH AND FABLE, by J. A. MACCULLOCH. Foreword by SIR J. G. FRAZER. Marshall Jones Company, Boston. 1932. Pp. 344.

Medieval Faith and Fable, by CANON MACCULLOCH, marshals a wide scholarship to set before us the inner side of the life and history

of the Middle Ages. For that is what we really get from an understanding of the beliefs, superstitions and customs which characterize any age. It is a stepping aside from what is ordinarily thought of as history, but without it much of history is unintelligible.

Scarcely any field within the range of his work has been untouched: the lingering paganism that was carried over into Christian custom; the belief in fairies and demons; the supernatural mistress or wife; the cults and legends that grew up about the worship of the Virgin; the tales of miracles performed by the saints or by their bones or garments. (Is not sainthood still attested in the eyes of the Roman Church by such miracles?) There is abundant folk lore concerning miracles of the Host, visions of the other world, and the mass of story that grew up about the lives of the heretics and skeptics. Then there were the great emotional movements such as the Children's Crusades, the rise of the Franciscans, the Flagellants, the Caputiati or White Hoods, Ku Klux Klansmen of the Twelfth Century. He does not omit the Goliards, makers of shocking songs, who really took literature out of the hands of the Classicists and put it into the possession of more ordinary folk. All these phases of medieval life are told with a wealth of detail and give a significant insight into the medieval period which is difficult to obtain from more extended works or from plain history. R.T.F.

FOOLS AND FOLLY DURING THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE. by BARBARA SWAIN. Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature. Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. \$3.00.

Stultorum Numerus Infinitus Est: Which is the Latin way of saying "a fool is born every minute." In her book, *Fools and Folly during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Miss Swain has brought together in an interesting way the literature, with much comment upon the practice of the middle ages of maintaining Court fools, and the usages of the Feast of Fools. These customs one feels must have grown out of the very sternness of the times, for human nature repressed in one part is pretty sure to seek outlet in another. The feast of fools was the one day of the year when one could insult his superior without fear of serious results. The awesome services of the church were parodied in the fool's mass. Even King and Pope did not escape. Here at last was the opportunity to show up their weaknesses in something the way the comic valentines were used fifty years ago to let those of whom one was jealous or for whom there was dislike feel the barb of a coarse wit and a devastating criticism. The author has done her work well and with thoroughness, and has provided many interesting passages in the original languages, which enhance its value. The accompanying translations and sources are indicated in the copious notes of the appendix. R.T.F.

THE DIVINE COMEDY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI, translated by JEFFERSON BUTLER FLETCHER. Illustrated. The Macmillan

Company, New York. 1931. Pp. xxii, 471. \$5.00.

A translation of *The Divine Comedy* into English that is readable, with a touch of poetic insight, has been a need for lo! these many years. Many are still depending for their knowledge of this masterpiece of literature upon the translation of Cary, made more than a hundred years ago. Of course the task has been essayed by others, but they have either been so literal as to destroy all pleasure in reading, or, when they have attempted rhyme, have mangled meaning for verse excepting of course the Longfellow translation which is still good. A small volume entitled *Dante*, by John Jay Chapman, which was published in 1927, showed such truth to the original poetic insight that the reviewer expressed the hope he might have attempted the complete translation instead of giving but a few fragments taken from here and there.

At long last Professor Fletcher has given a rhymed and metrical translation which has sufficient poetic quality to make the reading a pleasure. And this is a really remarkable achievement. It is inevitable, of course, that not throughout so long a work should equal standards obtain. There are dull moments when one is tempted to tinker the lines himself, but on the whole we have here probably the best English translation of the Comedy. And the difficulty of it must have been staggering. To transfer one's self into the white heat of emotions long dead, of men and measures long past, to reproduce something of the beauty and light, something of the darkness and cruelty, of thirteenth century Florence in her pride and glory, was a formidable task calling for unusual fortitude. To have succeeded so admirably as Professor Fletcher has done is a matter of high honor.

Why do our translators omit all mention of manuscript sources from which they derive their translations? This in itself would be a fascinating story, and would add to the interest in the work. R.T.F.

Philosophical Biography

BAYLE THE SCEPTIC, by HOWARD ROBINSON. Columbia University Press, New York. 1931. Pp. x, 334. \$4.25.

For one who took such a prominent place in the thought of the Enlightenment, Pierre Bayle has been strangely overlooked and neglected. It has been a long time since anything important has been written about him. We have now from the Columbia University Press, by Professor Robinson of Miami University, a most valuable study of Bayle's life and work. Here is detailed his birth in the country of the Protestant Albigenses, and his later theological career, which eventuated in his scepticism. Bayle was not really the enemy of religion, but he was hostile to religious cant, to ecclesiastical politics and chicanery, and all those forms of selfishness which dress themselves in robes of piety. In order to voice this opposition and still retain his head he had sometimes to resort to the same indirection

of which he complained in others.

While it may be charged against him that he gathered up the chit-chat and legends with which time had clothed the characters of whom he wrote in his famous Dictionary, yet he had what would today be particularly called the journalistic instinct of setting forth those legends which possessed a human interest, thus making his work unusually readable, if not unusually reliable. In the day in which he wrote even a calm and impersonal opposition to the reigning fundamentalism was interpreted as hostility to all religion, and so he suffered from heated attacks both by Catholic and Protestant, and was generally accused of being the enemy of all truth. However, as the author points out:

The eighteenth century, if it did not actually drop the pilot, threw overboard an immense amount of excess baggage, under the inspiration of Bayle. (p. 194)

However, his work was done in the bitterness of theological controversy, and bears the limitations of his time and method, as, for instance, in his discussion of Spinoza.

The very energy that Bayle used to condemn Spinoza's system indicates a self-conscious effort to free himself from the stigma of atheism. He did not uphold atheism as a system, but simply contented himself with showing that atheists were as good or better morally than the general run of believers, and that such a belief as morality for its own sake was not, therefore, untenable. (p. 218)

Everywhere in his dealing with individuals in the *Dictionary* he looks upon them from the narrow standpoint of his own theological interests. Thus

The *Dictionary* became the great arsenal for the rationalist war on revealed religion and ecclesiastical authority, a war in which Diderot and Voltaire, Lessing and Frederick the Great, Shaftesbury and Gibbon were but the more distinguished figures. (p. 219)

It was a part of the irony of history that this man who was considered the enemy of all religion should be buried in the French church at Rotterdam. But his influence did not end with his life.

As the author points out:

He has been called, with no great violation of the truth, the father of modern rationalism.

He quotes, also, Brunetière's judgment that

To forget Bayle or to suppress him is to mutilate and falsify the whole history of ideas in the eighteenth century:

and that of Rébelliau that

Bayle did alone the work of a whole sect, and in twenty-five years the work of a century.

Like Voltaire, upon whom Bayle undoubtedly exerted a great influence through his writings, the value of his work is not to be

measured by the present, but rather by the influence which he exerted on his own age in his attack upon special privilege, hypocrisy, and error.

Professor Robertson has performed a valuable service in calling our attention anew to the importance and value of the work of Bayle in the history of human thought.

R.T.F.

SPINOZA THE BIOSOPHER, by FREDERICK KETTNER. With an introduction by N. Roerich. Roerich Museum Press, New York, 1932. Pp. 263.

In the flood of literature occasioned by the tercentenary celebration of Spinoza's birth, the book by F. Kettner stands out as a notable contribution to commentaries on Spinoza's philosophy. We are used to reading about the geometrical method of demonstration, or about Substance and Modes. But it arouses our interest to learn that the aim of Spinoza's life of thinking was not to build one more metaphysical system, but to give an interpretation of life and to suggest some maxims of ethical behavior. As one goes over the pages of *Spinoza the Biosopher*, one begins to realize that the title of the philosopher's greatest book, *Ethica*, was not a misnomer, but, on the contrary, quite appropriate and fitting to its intention. To stress this fact, Mr. Kettner introduces the term *biosophy*, which reminds us of St. Bernard's definition of philosophy as *sapientia vitae*.

The principal thesis of the book, as I understand it, is that in order to make life worth living, it is necessary to comprehend man's place in society and nature. He is not an individual separable from the rest of things; indeed, he is dependent on everything that surrounds him. Images often deceive him; reason helps him to transform errors into truth and to reach finally that level of insight at which everything demands an explanation in the light of the whole, that is, to reach intuitive knowledge, as Spinoza called it. Hence, the first step in human education is the improvement of the understanding, and it is taken mainly for the sake of the second step which is the rational or ethical behavior of human beings. "Spinoza urges us to cultivate ethical-social understanding, and thus to create a true society. His teaching is, for a thinking man, the way of life."

RALPH B. WINN.

Scientific Philosophy

HUXLEY, PROPHET OF SCIENCE, by HOUSTON PETERSON. Longmans, Green & Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xiii, 338. \$3.50.

This biography of Thomas Henry Huxley is a well-written and interesting book, deserving of warm commendation. It is based, of course, on the *Life*, published by his son, Leonard, but contains also, as an appendix, an article which Huxley had written for the *Nineteenth Century* in reply to Arthur Balfour's attack on naturalism. Owing to Huxley's death in July 1895 it never appeared,

and is now printed for the first time. Beyond a number of misprints, chiefly in the shape of mis-spelt proper names, such as 'mephitic' (p. 123), 'Albemarle' and "Spottiswoode' (p. 155), 'Cotter' (p. 163), 'Littré' (p. 170), and 'Balliol' (p. 222), I have found little to which to take exception. The author, who strongly emphasizes Huxley's zeal as essentially moralistic, tries to make him responsible for the novels of his grandson, Aldous, without mentioning that his brother, Julian Sorel, effectively carries on the scientific traditions of the family. Perhaps Mr. Peterson should have allowed also for the infusion of Arnold blood into the present Huxleys, and have realized that intellectual qualities appear to be much more certainly inherited than moral. I am disposed to think also that Huxley was right in holding (*pace* his biographer and C. S. Peirce, p. 293-4) that Darwinism is nominalistic in tendency. For it involves the reduction of Platonic species to mere conveniences of classification, and represents the evolution of *new* species as due to the gradual accumulation of *individual* differences under natural selection. Thus it deals a death blow to logical Platonism.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCIENCES, OR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE, by F. R. TENNANT. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1932. Pp. ix, 191. \$1.50.

This little book is composed of six Tarner Lectures, delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1931-32, by the eminent theologian to whom the philosophic world is indebted also for the glorious discovery (with the aid of a printer's devil!) of by far the most valuable (though, alas, least appreciated) of the Laws of Thought, that of *Excluded Muddle*.* Most of the book consists of well-sustained critical discussions of epistemology, psychology, history, the natural and the mathematical sciences, and metaphysics; he gives no hint of his own solution of the difficulties he points out till he gets to page 184. It then appears that Dr. Tennant wishes to conceive dogmatic or revealed (Christian) theology as presupposing natural theology (p. 187) and developing out of it, while natural theology is "but a continuation of science as it is constituted before its main line of procedure from the historical takes on the direction towards the abstractly mathematical" (p. 186), and "apart from the sciences is baseless" (p. 187). Science, moreover, "presupposes psychology and theory of knowledge" (p. 189), and "is not positive or apodeictic; not necessary, unconditional or universal; not adequate or exhaustive. Its verification is pragmatic, not logical" (p. 185). Thus "science and theism spring from a common root" (p. 186), and are of a kindred nature. Both rest on postulates, though they verify them somewhat differently. "In science, verification consists in appeal to the external control of percepts, whereas the results by which religious postulation is pragmatically justified are concerned with valuation and edification

*See *Mind* for January 1926, p. 99.

rather than with existential facts. And the religious postulates are not so inevitable, "*prima facie*, as those of physical science: they involve a further, though not an essentially different, venture of faith." So the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. (p. 187.)

It is thus manifest that Dr. Tennant is a strong pragmatist and a humanist of the Protagorean, not of the positivist, type. Yet he is careful to point out that there is a "fatal flaw in all pragmatist inferences from the spiritual fruitfulness of an experience to its implication of real objects, or from the efficacy of a doctrine to its truth" (p. 176). The feeling is not enough to guarantee the inference; the pragmatic argument in religion must spring from a pragmatic epistemology, and not from mere craving. It is particularly gratifying to have this pointed out clearly, because all religious reasoning (even in the most consistent intellectualists) sooner or later takes on a pragmatic tinge, and because the subjective satisfaction which is thus attainable has aroused so much *odium anti-theologicum* against every sort of pragmatism. But a genuinely critical and thorough-going pragmatism will insist, with Dr. Tennant, that the verification of postulates is a strictly logical affair, which is common to religion and to science, and that neither is entitled to throw mud at the other. Altogether Dr. Tennant's book is well worth reading.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

RIDDLES OF SCIENCE, by SIR J. ARTHUR THOMSON. Liveright, New York. 1932. Pp. 387. \$3.50.

Much the larger part of this book is composed of short, chatty chapters on natural history subjects. It is written throughout in the charming style of which Sir Arthur Thomson is a master, and contains a certain amount of repetition, which, however, only once reaches the height of pp. 341 and 342, where practically the same quotation from A. R. Wallace figures twice on successive pages. In the concluding chapters Sir Arthur Thomson ventures on theory and discusses whether there is purpose in Evolution, and whether science leaves room for religion. Both questions are, rightly, answered in the affirmative, though one sometimes feels that stronger arguments might have been used. Thus p. 353 seems to grant that Darwinism *can* give a purely mechanical account of adaptation, and so leaves its teleological interpretation a mere matter of faith. Again, it is rather unsatisfactory to conceive 'evolution' as equally compatible with degeneration and with progress, and to insist merely that the latter has *in fact* prevailed 'on the whole.' For this leaves the fact without a reason. The logical conclusion to draw from this situation is that 'evolution,' so conceived, yields *no* account of progress, and that the 'cause of progress' needs inquiring into. The admission of novelty, similarly, (ch. 48) is hardly compatible with the appeal to the Aristotelian principle that "there can be nothing in the end of

a process which was not also present in the beginning" (p. 354). But it is perhaps ungrateful to raise such cavils about so popular and stimulating a book!

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE DE SACRAMENTO ALTARIS OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, edited by T. BRUCE BIRCH. Latin text and English translation. The Lutheran Literary Board, Burlington, Iowa. 1930. Pp. xlviii, 576.
- LOVE OF NATURE AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS, by HENRY RUSHTON FAIRCLOUGH. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1930. Pp. ix, 270. \$2.75.
- MOTIF-INDEX OF FOLK LITERATURE, by STITH THOMPSON. Indiana University Studies, Nos. 96, 97. Indiana University Library, Bloomington. 1932. Pp. 427.
- LYRIC VIRGINIA TODAY—AN ANTHOLOGY OF POEMS BY CONTEMPORARY POETS OF THE OLD DOMINION, edited by MARY SINTON LEITCH. Lincoln MacVeagh, Dial Press, Inc., New York. 1932. Pp. xx, 251. \$2.50.
- THE ORIENT IN AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISM—A STUDY OF EMERSON, THOREAU, AND ALCOTT, by ARTHUR CHRISTY. Columbia University Press, New York. 1932. Pp. xix, 382. \$4.00.
- THE THREE JAMESES, A FAMILY OF MINDS, by C. HARTLEY GRATTAN. Longmans, Green, and Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xi, 376. \$3.50.
- BODY, MIND AND SPIRIT, by ELWOOD WORCESTER and SAMUEL McCOMB. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1932. Pp. xix, 367. \$2.50.
- A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMILE MEYERSON, by GEORGE BOAS. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 1930. Pp. v, 146. \$1.75.
- THE BUDDHA AND THE CHRIST—AN EXPLORATION OF THE MEANING OF THE UNIVERSE AND OF THE PURPOSE OF HUMAN LIFE. The Hampton Lectures for 1932, by BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. xiii, 336. \$2.00.
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- PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT—A TEXTBOOK IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, by RAYMOND HOLDER WHEELER and FRANCIS THEODORE PERKINS. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1932. Pp. xxvi, 529. \$3.75.
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- MUSIC AND MEANING, by ELIZABETH ROBINSON WOODS. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1932. Pp. viii, 101. \$2.00.
- DAILY MEDITATION, OR THE PRACTICE OF REPOSE, by DHAN GOPAL MUKERJI. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. 1933. Pp. 40. \$0.90.
- DAVID HUME, by J. Y. T. GREIG. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. 436. \$3.75.
- OUT OF MY LIFE AND THOUGHT—AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, by ALBERT SCHWEITZER, tr. by C. T. CAMPION. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 1933. Pp. 288. \$2.50.
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- THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC, by FRANK MILLER CHAPMAN and PAUL HENLE. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1933. Pp. xiii, 384. \$2.00.
- THE STRICKEN LUTE—AN ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE OF PETER ABELARD, by ROGER B. LLOYD. Lovat Dickson, Ltd., London. 1932. Pp. 221. 8/6 net.
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- ATOM AND COSMOS—THE WORLD OF MODERN PHYSICS, by HANS REICHENBACH, tr. and revised in collaboration with author by EDWARD S. ALLEN. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1933. Pp. 300. \$2.00.
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- THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, by JEREMY BENTHAM. Edited with introduction by C. K. OGDEN. Tr. from French of ETIENNE DUMONT by RICHARD HILDRETH. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 1931. Pp. lii, 555.
- IN JOB'S BALANCES—ON THE SOURCES OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS, by LEO CHESTOV. Tr. by CAMILLA COVENTRY and C. A. MACARTNEY. J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 1932. Pp. xxi, 413. 18s.
- GOETHE CENTENARY PAPERS, Read at the University of Chicago. Edited by MARTIN SCHUTZE. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 1933. Pp. vi, 174. \$1.25.

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Our Contributors' Page

Out of the twilight of Roman history looms the serene and tragic figure of Boethius. His importance in the development of European thought and his right to the claim of being the first modern personalist are stated by the Editor in *Boethius, the Bridge between Ancient and Modern Culture*.


That mysticism is not a thing remote in principle from the common experience of mankind is indicated by **Hartley Burr Alexander** who writes on *The Mystic Way*. The concluding section of the paper will appear in the next issue. The author, who needs no introduction to students of philosophy, is professor of philosophy in Scripps College and in The University of Southern California.

Leibniz' Dual Conception of Human Reason contends that two distinct and mutually conflicting interpretations of the human mind are to be found in the writings of Leibniz. The author, **Adam Alles**, who writes from Annapolis, Maryland, is professor of philosophy in St. John's College.

A reconciliation of conflicting epistemological platforms is offered by **Dr. Ralph B. Winn** in *The Distinction between Truth and Knowledge*. Dr. Winn is extension lecturer in the City College of New York.

Ancient Greece provides the poetic motif for this issue. *Sappho* is rendered from the French of Paul Verlaine by **Dr. William van Wyck**. Author of note, Dr. van Wyck has been unusually successful as a translator of French verse. He resides in Paris. Other references to him will be found in Notes and Discussions and Along the Bookshelf. **Mary Brent Whiteside**, who contributes *Sappho and Emily*, is well-known to readers of the Personalist. She is at present in Los Angeles. "Emily," possibly it should be stated, is Emily Dickinson.

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THE LANTERN OF DIOGENES

SUMMER MOOD

¶ "Well," soliloquized Diogenes with a tone of finality, "I'm going fishing." There was an emphasis in his voice indicative of decision reached only after a lengthy and serious conflict between duty and desire. "This hunting business is getting pretty discouraging anyway," he continued, "even to a man of iron. Besides the dust is getting thick in the Agora; and a shed in Athens is an uncomfortably warm place to be on these long summer days. Lampsachus too declares on his oath that the fish are biting uncommonly well on the upper Cephisus. And —"

¶ Diogenes did not finish his sentence. Instead, he blew out his lamp, carefully tucked it away in a corner of his hut, picked up his fishing pole and tackle, and, with a smile of utter peace playing over his gnarled face, bolted the door and disappeared down the road in the direction of the Dipylum Gate.

¶ Rumor has it that our goodly Editor has gone with him. The office boy, left behind, and himself thinking more of blue seas, a horizon full of mountains, and a wandering road, than of philosophic wisdom, fails of inspiration. He herewith presents the facts, and trusts that both absent gentlemen will return sufficiently filled with high zeal to grace this page of the October issue with sagely words.